Patrolman Edward Myers

Sunday, 15 March 2020 02:43

Biography of Edward Myers
A Baltimore City Policeman

Edward Myers was born in Baltimore, Maryland at 4:00 AM on 11 October 1812, five months after war was declared against England. Edward was the fourth child and second son of Charles Myers (spelled Meyer) and Mary "Polly" Wagner (spelled Waggoner) of York County, Pennsylvania. Pages from the Myers Family Bible, at one time in the possession of now deceased cousin William Slaughter of Richmond, Virginia, list in the handwriting of Mary “Polly” (Wagner) Myers all of her children with specific dates and times of birth or christening.

What may have happened while Edward Myers was growing up in the Federal Hill and Baltimore Harbor area? On 27 February 1821, General Andrew Jackson arrived in Baltimore from Philadelphia and his approach was announced by discharges of artillery from a detachment of Captain Wilson's Independent Blues, stationed on Federal Hill. Edward Myers likely heard or witnessed the artillery fire as a nine-year-old. From 7 to 11 October 1824, the Revolutionary War hero, French General Lafayette, made a return visit (since 1781) to Baltimore and Edward Myers as a twelve-year-old may have witnessed the extensive celebrations in the city. Four ships fully dressed with flags and streamers sailed into the harbor to greet the General, his son Washington Lafayette, and U.S. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. On 13 October 1824, two days after Lafayette's departure, Edward Myers' younger brother, Ferdinand Myers, was born in Baltimore. On 6 April 1826, Edward Myers' younger sister, Julia Myers, was christened by Reverend Daniel Kurtz of Zion German Lutheran Church on Gay Street and Court House Plaza. Ferdinand Myers was christened nearly seven years after his birth on 1 June 1831, also by Reverend Daniel Kurtz. Edward Myers in 1842 lived on South Charles Street, north of Barre Street, according to the Baltimore City Directory.

On 23 May 1846, an enthusiastic crowd assembled in Monument Square of Baltimore City to support the annexation of Texas and the war that followed. Reverdy Johnson, General Sam Houston, and William Yancey, a member of Congress from Alabama, all addressed the Baltimore audience. On 1 June 1846, First Lieutenant John R. Kenly of the Eagle Artillery Company of Baltimore began recruiting a company of volunteers for the Mexican War, after first meeting with President James K. Polk in Washington, D.C., and then with Lieutenant Colonel William H. Watson, the newly appointed commander of the Baltimore and Washington, D.C. Battalion. On 2 June 1846, Kenly opened a rendezvous in the armory of the Eagle Artillery Company, and another at Trades' Union Hall, corner of Baltimore Street and Triplett's Alley. According to Kenly, volunteers came in with extraordinary rapidity. On 4 June 1846, Kenly carried to the city of Washington by railroad two officers and 58 men, the whole having been recruited by Kenly in less than 36 hours. Prior to leaving his rendezvous on Baltimore Street, Kenly was honored and gratified by being presented with a sword and sash by Captain George P. Kane, the commanding officer, on behalf of the Eagle Artillery Company, with which Kenly had been connected as a private and officer for several years. On reaching Washington, Kenly and his new recruits were met by the volunteers from Baltimore who had preceded them. Kenly and his recruits were escorted to the War Department, and from there they marched to the Marine Barracks, where the recruits were assigned quarters. Kenly received his commission as Captain from Thomas G. Pratt, Governor of Maryland, that same day.

Edward Myers enlisted for one year of military service on 4 June 1846 as a Private with Captain John R. Kenly's Company E in the Baltimore and Washington, D.C. Battalion. Edward Myers was described in his enlistment and pension records as being 5 feet 4 inches tall, of light complexion, dark eyes, dark hair, and by occupation a baker. On 5 June 1846, Captain Kenly sent two of his officers, Lieutenants Francis B. Schaeffer and Oden Bowie (later Governor of Maryland and for whom Odenton was named), back to Baltimore to bring more men, who were reportedly anxious to join Kenly's company. On 8 June 1846, Kenly's company, known as "Baltimore's Own," marched back to the War Department, where members of the company were mustered into the service of the United States by Lorenzo Thomas, Major and Assistant Adjutant-General United States Army, for 12 months of service. The company consisted of three officers and 84 non-commissioned officers and privates.

On 10 June 1846, the Baltimore and Washington, D.C. Battalion was ordered by the Secretary of War to leave the Marine Barracks, where it had been quartered, to Fort Washington, on the banks of the Potomac River, seven miles below the town of Alexandria. The cause of the unexpected order was an application from the Mayor of the City of Washington, who had been incensed at the bad behavior of some of the men, and who, as it was alleged, "had entered into a personal quarrel with them, in which it well may be supposed, he was not much the gainer." On 13 June 1846, the Battalion left Fort Washington and embarked on board the steamer Powhatan, and at 8:00 PM arrived alongside the steamer Massachusetts, lying in the river, which had been chartered by the Government to convey the Battalion and a large amount of stores to Point Isabel on the Gulf of Mexico. Kenly indicated in his diary that it had been raining hard all day and suddenly five hundred men were thrown upon a steamer of seven hundred tons' burden, whose hold and deck were covered with forage and other military stores. A scene of indescribable confusion ensued, which the darkness seemed to swell and magnify, and no repose was had on that night of chaos, except that which was obtained through pure exhaustion.

From 20 to 24 September 1846, Edward Myers fought at the Battle of Monterrey in Mexico. From December 1846 until at least April 1847, Edward Myers performed extra duty in Mexico as a baker for his battalion. According to the military service records from the National Archives for Edward Myers, he was billed by the Army $1.22 for a pair of lost Army brogans, 56 cents for a lost white bayonet scabbard belt, and 10 cents for a bayonet scabbard free plate. Edward Myers was discharged on 30 May 1847 in Tampico, Mexico and returned to Baltimore.

On 20 November 1848, Edward Myers was married in Baltimore, Maryland by Reverend Reese to Mary A. Flahart. Four children were born to this marriage: Henrietta, born 21 March 1849, Julia, Alexander, born 6 May 1853, and Edward Myers, all in Baltimore. Mary A. (Flahart) Myers died in the 1850's in Baltimore and Edward Myers was married a second time on 30 April 1866 by Reverend Burnette (also spelled Burnet) of the Baptist Church in Baltimore to Mary Elizabeth Stall, the daughter of the recently deceased Andrew J. Stall (who died 17 September 1862, Battle of Antietam) and Mary Ann Waters Roberts of Baltimore. Three children were born to this couple: Robert Charles Myers, Henry Russell Myers, and Lucy C. Myers. Edward Myers in 1851 was a baker by trade and lived on Parkin Street, south of Lombard Street. He moved to Charles Street between Hamburg and Cross Streets in 1853.

After Edward Myers became a policeman in 1853, assigned to the Southern District in Baltimore, and many of his encounters while on duty with unruly individuals in the city were recorded in history in the form of newspaper articles, as follows:

In a 4 May 1853 Baltimore Sun article: “In early May 1853, about 12:00 on Monday night, whilst Watchman Myers of the Southern District was going his round, he discovered on fire a building in Spring Court, two doors from Charles Street, and succeeded in extinguishing the flames before much damage was sustained.”

In a 25 January 1854 Baltimore Sun article: “Riotous Conduct: Jeremiah Simpson, on the charge of riotous conduct at Camden Station, was arrested by Watchman Edward Myers, and committed to jail by Justice Pennington, in default of security to answer before court.”

In a 16 June 1854 Baltimore Sun article: “Rescued from Drowning: About 1:00 yesterday morning, whilst Watchman Myers was going his round, he heard a man struggling in the water at Light Street Wharf. He hurried to the spot and succeeded in saving the life of the man, who was from the Eastern Shore, and who fell overboard whilst attempting to board a vessel.”

In a 6 July 1854 Baltimore Sun article: “Dreadful Railroad Accident, Awful Loss of Life, 28 Person Killed, 50 or 60 Persons Wounded” - Edward Myers was mentioned three times as Southern District Watchman, Mexican War veteran, or resident of 216 Barre Street. Edward Myers was seriously injured in this Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad train accident nine miles from Baltimore City. George Butler, his travel companion and also a Mexican War veteran, pulled Edward Myers out of the wreckage and saved his life. The newspaper article stated how surprised authorities were that Edward Myers survived.

In a 27 December 1854 Baltimore Sun article: “George Sahn was arrested by Officer Myers, and was charged with assaulting and beating Catharine Wollen. George Sahn was committed for court by Justice Auld.”

In a 5 April 1855 Baltimore Sun article: “Passing Counterfeit Money: Jacob Wyre was arrested by Watchman Myers upon the charge of passing a five dollar bank bill on the Bank of Commerce, and which proved to be a counterfeit. Justice Lawder committed him to jail in default of security for a further examination.”

In a 15 January 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “Incendiarism: Watchman Myers of the Southern District, whilst going his rounds on Tuesday morning, discovered that the house on the corner of Perry and Hanover Streets had been forced open and then set on fire under the stairway, which Watchman Myers promptly extinguished.”

In an 11 March 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “S. Leonard was arrested by Officers Myers and Poulton upon the charge of assaulting and beating Aquilla Christopher. S. Leonard was held to bail to answer at court by Justice Webb.”

In a 14 April 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “William Bryan and Lawrence Buck were arrested by officers Myers and Poulton on the charge of throwing bricks in the street. Justice Webb fined them each one dollar with costs, and committed them to jail in default of security to keep quiet for six months.”

In a 30 May 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “About 1 o’clock on Friday morning, Officer Myers of the Southern District discovered a man sitting upon the curbstone in Pratt Street. Officer Myers accosted him, and by his incoherent replies, concluded the man was under the influence of liquor, as he appeared very drowsy. With assistance, the man was carried toward the Southern Station but died before his bearers could arrive there. His name is unknown and nothing was found upon his person by which his name or residence could be learned. Coroner Benson was sent for and he held an inquest over the body, and the jury rendered a verdict of death by intoxication.”

In a 14 August 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “Andrew Hackett was arrested by Officer Myers and was charged with exposing his person in the Hanover Market. Justice Webb committed him for court.”

In a 12 December 1857 Baltimore Sun article: “On Thursday night, Officers Myers and Coulton (previously named as Poulton) of the Southern District, arrested Mark Silverstine, a manufacturer of hats, on a charge of setting fire to his store, No. 171 West Pratt Street, an account of the partial burning of which appeared in our last issue. At first, the fire was supposed to have originated from the accident, but something excited suspicion against him and caused his arrest. He was examined before Justice Boyd, who in default of security, committed him to jail to await the reaction of the grand jury.”

     In a 6 April 1858 Baltimore Sun article:     

6 April 1858 Baltimore Sun article

     In a 17 July 1858 Baltimore Sun article: 

17 July 1858 Baltimore Sun article  

In a 3 November 1858 Baltimore Sun article:    

3 November 1858 Baltimore Sun article

     In a 23 April 1859 Baltimore Sun article:

23 April 1859 Baltimore Sun article

     In a 2 January 1860 Baltimore Sun article:

2 January 1860 Baltimore Sun article

     In a 28 June 1861 Baltimore Sun article:  

28 June 1861 Baltimore Sun article copy 2  

In a 3 July 1861 Baltimore Sun article:

3 July 1861 Baltimore Sun article

     In a 23 September 1861 Baltimore Sun article:

23 September 1861 Baltimore Sun article

    In a 24 June 1863 Baltimore Sun article:

24 June 1863 Baltimore Sun article

 

     As was stated earlier, Edward and his family moved in 1854 to 216 Barre Street. His son by his second marriage, Henry Russell Myers, lived at this same address in 1888. By the late 1850s Edward Myers lived at 26 Ross Street, where his mother resided, and until the end of the Civil War was working as a policeman, and at the beginning of the Civil War, for Union Colonel John R. Kenly, his former company commander during the Mexican War. Colonel Kenly was the Provost Marshal of Baltimore at that time. Edward Myers' mother died at the 26 Ross Street address in 1860.

     Retired General John R. Kenly kept a diary during the Mexican War and had it published in 1873 by Lippincott of Philadelphia, entitled Memoirs of a Maryland Volunteer, War With Mexico, 1846-1848. In this rare book, which was located at the historic Peabody Library in Baltimore, are incredible details of the entire military campaign in northern Mexico, including every imaginable experience by the soldiers of this company, including one instance when Captain Kenly's company met commanding General Zachary Taylor, later to become President Taylor.

     Some years later, Edward Myers worked as a laborer in South Baltimore and his last residence was 673 Hanover Street when he died on 8 September 1884. Edward's son, Robert Charles Myers, lived at the 673 Hanover Street address in 1883. Edward Myers died of pneumonia, which he had for three weeks, according to his death certificate. Edward was buried on 10 September 1884 in Cedar Hill Cemetery, Section A, Lot 73, in northern Anne Arundel County, Maryland. His medical attendant was Dr. J. C. Burch of 151 Hanover Street and the undertaker was William G. Tiellner of 65 South Eutaw Street. On 14 March 1887, attorney Patrick O'Farrell of 110 67th Street N.W. Washington, D.C. prosecuted the pension claim for widowed Mary E. Myers, who lived at the time at 611 Little Paca Street in Baltimore.

     On 25 March 1887, Henry Russell Myers and Henrietta Slaughter signed affidavits as witnesses to their acquaintance with and relationship to the deceased Edward Myers. Daughter Henrietta (Myers) Slaughter, the wife of Washington Lafayette Slaughter, stated that she was present at the marriage ceremony in 1866 when her father Edward Myers and Mary Elizabeth Stall were married. By 2 November 1887, widow Mary E. Myers was living at 533 South Paca Street, according to the pension record. John R. Kenly, as a retired Major General in the United States Army in 1887, signed an affidavit and was a witness to Edward Myers' service in Kenly’s company during the Mexican War. Also in 1887, Mary E. Myers claimed that she did not know if her deceased husband Edward Myers received the 160 acres of bounty land to which he was entitled by law. Her attorney noted that there was no record of bounty land being granted.

Devider color with motto

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

 

Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Robert A Miller Jr

Sunday, 15 March 2020 01:42

Robert A Miller Jr

Robert A Miller Jr 2

(The Above Rider is not Robert A Miller)

Park Police 1959

KSCN0046

Courtesy Robert Miller

ID card back

Courtesy Robert Miller

Police Officer Robert Aaron Miller, known as "RAM" Robert Aaron Miller or the "The Dog Man"  began his career with the Baltimore City Park Police where he would work Motors among other duties before the Park Police would Merger with the City Police. As a member of the City Police he took part in helping to build the K9 unit. Under Police Commissioner Heprin, Officer Miller would volunteer for and be found qualified to work as part of Baltimore's experimental K9 unit.


THE METHOD OF SELECTING OFFICERS:

It must be kept in mind that an officer to work with a dog must want to do so-he cannot be forced into the job as his reactions to his work reflects in the animal. All officers, therefore, must volunteer. From this list they are carefully screened and selected. First, they must meet certain requirements:
(a) They must live in their own home. This home must have adequate ground or a yard to house and care for a dog.

(b) The officer's wife and family must be investigated from the stand point of willingness and approval.

(c) They must have available an automobile to use at all times.

(d) Their personnel record with the department must be good.

(e) Sufficient practical police experience or knowledge before being assigned to unit.

 

The cost of the K-9 Corps consists of the salary of the personnel assigned to the unit plus an estimated" figure of $200 per year per dog. (This latter figure is based on the cost of food, equipment and veterinary charges.) All dogs have been donated outright to the department for use in police work. They must be German Shepherd dogs (male) sound of body, physically fit and of good even temperament-neither vicious nor shy, and preferably under 3 years of age. No kennel facilities are provided. Each dog is assigned to an officer and from that point on lives with him at his home. The fact that the dog is with the officer constantly not only provides a closer bond of relationship between man and dog, but it also eliminates the necessity of the erection of expensive kennels and the personnel to staff same. Food is purchased by the department and distributed to the individual officer as required. This food consists of a kennel biscuit and canned horse meat or beef. Each officer is taught to train his own dog. The dog is first trained, in basic obedience, and tested for gun shyness. Next, attack work and then trailing (location of lost persons or criminals). Finally, the dog is trained to locate articles or materials that could be used as evidence. (It is extremely important in the attack training that the dog attacks only on command of his handler and releases immediately when told.) Ifficer Miller met or exceeded every requirment becoming one of Baltimores first K-9 officer/handlers. Officer Miller was the handler to a dog named Tufel #46 of Baltimore first 62 dogs. Often the way it was done, would be to obtain as many dogs as they could, all dogs were donated to the Department and were usually between 9 months and 1 1/2 years old when accepted. The training director then was, Sergeant Thomas A. Knott, he would inspect all dogs offered to insure that they are in sound physical condition and of good disposition. Once found qualified the dog is turned over to a veterinarian for an extensive check-up to discover any possible physical or medical defects. The dogs and handlers are then paired and begin schooling. The team of instructors was comprised of two experienced trainers Officers William A. Lejewski and John F. Barnard. This Education and Training Unit is supervised by Sergeant Knott a twenty-three year veteran of the Department. Sergeant Knott has been training dogs for more than forty years.

The teams become well versed in building and field searches for both subjects and objects. This training also includes the recovery of weapons. Among the thirty-nine dogs and handlers deployed by the Department many were also proficient in specialized areas. Five were effective in bomb detection and over one half of the dogs have proved to be reliable in drug detection. Officer Miller took part in a new training program was introduced to enable K-9 teams to detect the presence of deceased persons. The Officers, in their continuing effort to improve and refine the skills of their dogs, also spend many off-duty hours in training. Numerous teams hold American Kennel Club Degrees. The Companion Dog Degree can be obtained only after a dog receives a minimum score of 170 out of a possible 200 points by three different AKC judges in obedience. The Tracking Degree is awarded to a dog who follows a 500 yard track left by a stranger within 40 feet, under the watchful eyes of two AKC judges. The track must be from fifteen minutes to two hours old. This must be accomplished while on his handler's lead and at the end, locate an object left by the stranger. The special skills developed by the teams are applied almost daily. A systematic search of a large building for a suspect by a group of eight to ten officers would take three to four hours. The same search by a Canine team requires only one-fifth the time.

German Sheapards could be handled, trained to see which were trainable and which were not, pretty fast. Baltimore required a different kind of dog, so while nearly all dogs can be trained to be a good guard/security dog, only a few could be Baltimore dogs. Our dogs had to be ale to be around kids, and adults, even disobediant criminals without biting, or attacking unless given a command. It took a special kind of person to be a handler, further it took a special family, because the handlers of the Baaltimore K9 took their work home with them, Officer Miller and his family helped form what has become one of America's best K9 units, they helped set upa program where when dogs didn't make the cut here, they sent on to the military where some went on to be quite heroic. As one of the first members of what became one the finest K9 units in the country, Officer Miller and his family along with only a select few other officers with their familes in the unit developed a training method that would go on to be copied by nearly every K9 unit in the country. Our hats off to Officer Miller and the other members of his unit. See our K9 page HERE

 

  60 k9 coat 

P/O Robert A Millers Jr's 1960 - Baltimore Police Winter Coat
with Emergency Services Arm Band
rocker patch
Shoulder Patch

 k9 reefer

P/O Robert A Miller Jr's 1960 - Rocker Shoulder, and K9 patch

1960 K9 jacket

P/O Robert A Miller Jr's Leather K9 Handlers Jacket


Robert A Miller Jr with DP

Officer William Mille

Miller K9 ad 
Off Miller with Tuefel


Miller tank 72

Baltimore Bomb Squad R Miller in State Police Vehicle


Tuefel 1

Tuefel


Tuefel 2

Tuefel Wearing his Patrol Cap


Miller Bomb squad

RAM's Bomb Tech ID Card


miller dunkirk

RAM w/ TueFel


Miller FOP member

R Miller's FOP Membership Card signed by D Woods 1972


RAM FOP 72   73 1st vice prez
Robert Miller Served a term as 1st Vice President of FOP Lodge #3


Miller 2Brass with class

Courtesy Robert Miller


RAM 19 pistol sharpshooter

Courtesy Robert Miller


RAM 1959
Courtesy Robert Milller


K9course

Robert Miller and Tuefel


K9 hard at work


K9 hard at work 2


K9 hard at work 3

RAM's family showing how their K9 became part of the family


K9 hard at work 4


K9 hard at work 5


K9 hard at work 6


K9 hard at work 7


K9 MD Seal


K9 wallet pics

Wallet Photo


K9 work dog family

A Family Dog


Miller retired

Robert A Miller's Retirement


RAM 1 2

Current Pics of the RAM 2014

 RAM Card featurig Tuefel 72

Devider color with motto

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

39 Minutes of Terror

Saturday, 14 March 2020 13:45

Baltimore City Police

39 Minutes of Terror
LOMBARD & CAREY

Hail of sniper bullets in 1976 changed five lives forever. The incident forever changed the Baltimore Police Department One Officer dead four others shot and critically wounded A detailed account of the incident from official reports including the time line of each minute as this unfolded. Official BPD reports, photographs from public domain and news articles will give the full story as never seen or heard before. With the guidance, assistance and help of Lieutenant Joseph Key who was 1930 unit that faithful night to later assume 2501 Command Post, Incident Commander. The Command Post Unit #2501 once activated becomes the voice and authority of the Baltimore Police Commissioner. A transcript of each BPD Radio channel will be posted in its entirety. Each and every word that was spoken over BPD communications will be presented to give insight as to exactly was taking place that night.

PROLOGUE

I provided Bill Hackley with the materials regarding Lombard and Carey and the inception of the Quick Response Teams because I had them for thirty plus years and, like me, they were just getting older and not doing anybody much good. What good can these materials do? They can serve as a reminder that preserving the status quo in the dangerous business of police work can get cops killed. All of the materials concerning Lombard and Carey are a matter of public record. The documents concerning the establishing of the Quick Response Teams are not public records, but, since I wrote them and have provided them to countless other agencies, I am putting them out there. Their only relevance now is to history. The reader will note that they are signed by the, then, Acting Commanding Officer of Tactical, who believed that any correspondence from his unit should be signed by him. As long as the program was approved, it didn’t make much difference to me whose signature was on it. Regardless, they document the founding of SWAT operations in the Baltimore Police Department at a time when moving ahead with new concepts was like pulling good teeth out of a really pissed off Grizzly Bear’s mouth–a chancy business at best.

Some of the heroes in the command structure at the beginning of that process were Bishop Robinson and Joe Bolesta. Of particular note on the operational level, then and later, was Lieutenant Darryl Duggins (1901 in the City Wide Communications Tape Transcript). Duggins was a sometimes recalcitrant, always plain spoken, always forge ahead and damn the "brass," brilliant leader and implementer of the structural minutia that makes a group of diverse and resistive personalities into a cohesive unit. Darryl was a Marine at Chosin Reservoir. Nothing else needs to be said.

How do the documents concerning the founding of the QRT relate to Lombard and Carey? The one led to the other, or, rather, significantly sped up the other. In the months just prior to Lombard and Carey, Bishop Robinson, who was Chief of Patrol, convened several meetings of Tactical supervisors and the Commanding Officer of Tactical, Joe Bolesta. Bolesta was, and is, a more refined version of Duggins; i.e., a man that had the fortitude to stand up to command, but could do it without making unnecessary enemies that could hurt

his goals and those of his unit. I was a sergeant in Tactical at the time (1930 and 2501 in the City Wide Communications Tape Transcript) and was assigned the task of writing the general order for the resolution of sniper, barricade, and hostage situations. I completed that assignment by January of 1976. With Captain Bolesta’s permission, I began training my squad in SWAT procedures. We worked mostly on our time with equipment we bought and used tactical procedures I had acquired from military tactics manuals, Los Angeles SWAT (In operation, by contrast, since the late 60's), New York SWAT, and other similar programs. We did all of the physical training on our own time, although the effort was something like filling up a balloon with mud. In February of ‘76, Captain Bolesta sent my squad to the FBI SWAT school. On Good Friday, April 16, 1976, my squad was the only squad in the Baltimore Police Department with any SWAT training. On that evening John Earl Williams decided to impress his girlfriend by killing a few cops.

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on Good Friday the temperature was above 90 degrees. TAC had been redeployed to the area around Lombard and Carey because Williams had called and told Communications that he planned to kill cops. Williams was a nothing person whose girlfriend (in his mind only) had told him to get lost. His attempt to impress her landed him in prison, where, the last I heard, he has had many relationships much more "fulfilling" than the one he used as an excuse for his madness. I’m sure his role in prison is the achievement pinnacle of his pathetic life.

Williams had briefly been in the National Guard and had received some training in weapons and tactics from them. He had also stolen some equipment from the Guard and had amassed a large quantity of ammunition and long guns. Specifically, that night he was shooting a 300 Winchester magnum, an 8mm Magnum, a 30-06, a 12 gauge shotgun, and perhaps others. After ingesting some PCP, he began his shooting spree shortly before 7:00 p.m.. His first targets were TAC officers, who, ironically, became his targets because of their redeployment to the area in response to his threats.

As for the rest of the story, the transcript of the tapes and photos will tell it. All of the officers were shot within the first nine minutes of the inception of the incident. They were removed from the line of fire within forty minutes and the

incident was over in less than an hour. There were numerous heroes on that night, starting with, of course, Jimmy Halcomb, a decorated Marine Vietnam veteran. A hero not just because he gave his life, but because he, like nearly two hundred other cops, responded to the call of cops taking fire. He and the officers who were wounded (Jimmy Brennan, Art Kennel, Neal Splain, Calvin Mencken, Roland Miller) were trying to stop Williams and did what cops do by profession and calling–they ran into the mouth of the dragon when others were running away. Also, off duty Homicide Detective, Nick Giangrazo (forgive the spelling), who ran from a position of safety across Lombard Street into the killing zone to help put Jimmy Brennan in a van and drive him from the scene. Brennan had been dragged behind the van by his friend and fellow Western District Officer, Doug Bryson, during a hail of gunfire. He had lain there bleeding from the time the incident began, but was kept alive by Bryson who had applied direct pressure to Brennan's gaping, gushing wounds in his elbow and side. Then there was Mike Hurm from TAC and Frank Stallings from the Western who pulled Halcomb out during the barrage of cover fire. It was, unfortunately, too late because Officer Halcomb had died instantly, but their effort was no less courageous. The reality was that all of the officers who responded that night did so selflessly and without concern for their personal safety and with the one overriding motivation of helping brother officers.

The entire incident lasted a little more than thirty-five minutes, but its repercussions still linger through today. I was scheduled to start training other TAC squads in SWAT tactics on Monday, April 19th. Lombard and Carey had been the first incident where members of the, then, nonexistent QRT had been deployed. Members of my squad were assigned as observers for the counter-sniper, an evacuation team, a gas deployment team, and entry team for 1303 Lombard after Williams was forced out by the cover fire fusillade. Those roles had been learned and practiced primarily on their own time. Lombard and Carey would lay the groundwork for ensuring that training and equipping the QRT became a mandated, on-duty, part of the Department’s response to sniper, barricade, and hostage situations.

There were many flaws in the Department’s response to Lombard and Carey. Communications’ discipline was practically nonexistent. Officers gave conflicting information concerning the location of Williams, which resulted in

officers firing on officers. Contradictory information concerning the removal of wounded officers resulted in Jimmy Halcomb being left where he fell for over twenty minutes. Again, Halcomb was killed immediately, but that didn’t change the fact that his location should have been identified and a rescue effort mounted much more quickly. The command post, 2501, was implemented and manned only by a rookie sergeant who gave all of the orders until 1303 Lombard had been declared secure by the entry team. Two colonels were on the scene, but neither gave orders, responded and/or stayed at the command post until after Williams came out.

Over the years there has been much criticism concerning the handling of Lombard and Carey. The main reason why it occurred the way it did, however, was the failure by the Department to recognize the need for a specialized team and disciplined response to such incidents well before the efforts of Bishop Robinson and Joe Bolesta. After all, there had been many similar incidents around the country and several such incidents in Baltimore prior to April 16th. Old line thinking, petty interdepartmental rivalries, and a drag-them-out-by-their-hair mentality dictated the entire response spectrum to situations like Lombard and Carey. I wish that I could say that Good Friday, April 16, 1976 changed all of that, but it would take many years for any true change to occur and, even then, not a whole hearted change. In addition to honoring the cops that were there that night, the posting of these materials is meant to stand as a stark reminder of what can happen when a police department loses, or, more accurately, never finds its ability to give the same weight to issues vital to officer safety as it does to its crime reduction mission. In the past crime reduction has trumped all other concerns. Today, the certain eventuality of terrorist attacks in this country should compel the Baltimore Police Department to ensure that all of its officers are well prepared to meet such challenges. It is an absolute that Baltimore Police Officers will thrust themselves into the breach, with or without proper training, with or without appropriate guidelines, and with or without necessary equipment. They will do so and some will pay the price like Jimmy Halcomb, Jimmy Brennan, Roland Miller, Art Kennel, Neal Splain, and Calvin Mencken did on that hot night in April. It is incumbent on the Baltimore Police Department to provide them the tools, guidelines, and training they will need. The tragedy of Lombard and Carey demands that.

Finally, I didn’t know what I was going to do with the documents that I had until I came across Bill Hackley’s website. I was much impressed by his sole dedication to memorializing the Baltimore Police Department’s rich history and the huge amount of work he puts into the effort. Although retired from active service, his exemplary service to the Department and its officers continues today. I can think of no better way to have the story of Lombard and Carey told than to entrust it to Bill Hackley. I know he will do it justice.

Charles J. Key
Lieutenant, Baltimore Police Department (Retired)

po Halcomb

Baltimore City Police Officer Jimmy Dale Halcomb age 31, E.O.W. April 16, 1976, an 8 year veteran of the Western District and a former Marine. He was married, the father of two children and his widow Angela was expecting their 3rd. child within the month. His badge number is 293 and he was the first BPD Officer to die in the line of duty in 1976. - Jimmy died on Good Friday and his killer was born on Christmas Day, 18 years earlier.

officers wounded

Officer James A. Brennan, 25 years old assigned Western District, wounds on the left side and right shoulder. - Officer Neil C. Splain, 28 years old assigned Southern District, shotgun wounds in the face. - Officer Roland W. Miller, 23 years old assigned Southern District, shotgun wounds left arm. - Officer Calvin L. Mencken, Jr. Assigned to the Southern District, shotgun wounds in the face. - Officer Arthur E. Kennell,Jr. shotgun wounds in the face and eyes. - Civilian: George Weaver 23 years old, bullet wound in the hand.
Scan9

This sketch is slightly off scale as you can clearly see in the aerial shots. The BCFD house should be where the two cars are sketched. As officers reported on the air that they were on the roof of the firehouse and were looking down on where the injured officers were pinned down.

Officer Jimmy Halcomb and the other officers were shot within six minutes of the start of this incident, avery warm evening with 90+ degrees at the time of this operation.

When cover fire was ordered for the attempt for officers to reach the injured officers 487 rounds were fired in sixty seconds as determined by reports written by each officer involved.

Devider

Police Department

Baltimore, Maryland
16, April 1976

TRANSCRIPT

City-Wide Dispatcher

450Mhz

Time:18:59:10

CAR: 1933. We have shots fired.

DIS: Unit in reference to the shots being fired. No. the unit with the shots fired.

CAR: 1933 in the unit block of South Carey, we got somebody shooting at us.

DIS: Unit South Carey. 10-4

SIMULCAST

DIS: Unit Block of South Carey,1933 says someone is discharging firearms at that location. Unit block of south Carey.

FT: Foxtrot responding.

DIS: Okay. 1933 are they shooting at you.

CAR: 10-4, they shot the radiator out of the car.

(ALERT TONE)

DIS: All units be advised they are shooting at 1933 car, unit block of south Carey SIGNAL 13, time 1900

CAR:__?___ responding to South Carey.

CAR: 1933- advise them not to come up Carey Street. They're gonna get shot.

DIS: all units all units 10-6 1933 only.

CAR: Tell them not to come up Carey , they're gonna get shot.

DIS: Don't come up Carey Street.

SIMULCAST

DIS: All units be advised do not go up Carey Street. Do not go on the unit block of Carey.

CAR: Keep 'em off Lombard. 1901 in reference.

19:01:00

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Ascertain if 1933 can operate his vehicle and if so, get it out of that area.

DIS: 1933

CAR: 1912 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead

CAR: Be advised the third floor house on the corner. The man is armed with a shotgun.
DIS: Third floor house on the corner Unit block Carey?

CAR: __?__ hundred block of South Carey.

DIS: Cruising Patrol Eleven.

CAR: C.P. 11.

DIS: Okay you respond to the unit block South Carey, don't go on Carey Street at this time.

CAR: Negative on Carey Street 10-4, sir.

DIS: OK

CAR: 1914. Advise Fox Trot it sounds like rifle fire.

DIS: All units 10-6 1914, go ahead.

CAR: Sir, advise Foxtrot it sounds like rifle fire.

FT: Fox Trot OK, we'll leave the area.

DIS: OK, I got rifle fire, is that the unit block South Carey on the corner; can you give me a house number or something better.

CAR: --?---?---- House.

DIS: The third floor the corner house. Can you give me the corner? What's it, Northwest, Southwest corner.

CAR: Southwest corner second house from the corner.

DIS: Southwest corner, second house.

SIMULCAST

DIS: Ok, in reference to this shooting, the subject is in the second house from the corner, Southwest corner. He's on the third floor. He may have a rifle. Fox Trot use caution.

19:02:30

FT: Fox Trot OK we're a good distance away, and we still have it under observation.

DIS: 10-4

CAR: Cruising Patrol Eleven --?--. CP 11.

CAR: 1924---have our units switch to City-Wide so we can control --?--.

DIS: KGA to unit 9

19:03:10

CAR: 1919- we still got gun shots. Have them get these people in the house.

CAR: Cruising Patrol 11.

CAR: Have all units clear these people off the street.

DIS: KGA to unit 9.

CAR: 1912 to Fox Trot. Leave the area.

FT: Fox Trot OK.

CAR: CP 11.

CAR: 1912

SIMULCAST

DIS: Attention all cars, information from Unit 9, stay out of the Unit Block of South Carey Street. Try to get a location.

CAR: 10-33, 10-33.

19:04:00

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 793- My partner's hit down here. Get me an Ambo.

DIS: What location?

CAR: Please get me the ambo down here now.

CAR: 10-33

DIS: Where's 793 at?

CAR: Unit South Carey Street; Unit South Carey.

DIS: OK.

Car: C.P. 11- Ascertain where they want us to move into for a command post?

DIS: KGA to Unit 9.

Car: Unit block of South Carey, pedestrians are still coming in this area.

DIS: All units 10-6 on this channel in reference to the 10-33. 10-6. 793 can you give us an exact location?

CAR: Yes Sir, right in front of the fire house on Carey Street. Don't let these come in here. And if you could have some of these police return fire to that guy so we can get this officer out of here.

CAR: 1912 with a 10-33. 1912.

19:05:10

DIS: 1912.

CAR: Be advised Sir the subject is on the third floor and it's the second house in from the store. There's a pocketbook on the front steps and information from the neighbors, this guy's got arsenal in there. Better get E.V.U. over there.

DIS: Ok, see if you can ascertain from a neighbor or somebody, get us an exact address.

SIMULCAST

Attention all cars in reference to Carey Street. We have second house from the store. He's in the third floor: he's heavily armed.

CAR: 1944.

DIS: 1944.

CAR: Can you have a unit respond to----ah, correction, the truck. The sniper equipment on it---ah, stand by. I'll give you a location later.

CAR: Is the E.V.U. unit responding?

DIS: Cruising Patrol 11's on the way; where do you want Cruising Patrol 11 to go?

CAR: 1930- Did anybody establish a command post?

19:06:50

DIS: KGA to Unit 9.

CAR: 1901

DIS: 1901, can you set up a Command Post?

CAR: 10-4, when I arrive on the scene. But in the meantime can you have 1910, 20 and 30 cordon off the area, don their jump suits and stand by?

CAR 1930; I have set up a Command Post at Baltimore and Carey, a block away from it; have CP 11, 10-11 me here. We're moving people back.

DIS: Cruising Patrol 11.

CAR: 10-4 Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: I'm on the eastern side of Carey Street at Baltimore and Carey, a block from the shots.

LOMBARD CAREY2a

CAR: 1919.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Advise those units not to walk down Carey. Gunshot fire, is coming straight up Carey. Clear shot.

DIS: The Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey, East of Carey.

CAR: 10-4.

SIMULCAST

DIS: ALL Units be advised the Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey, east of Carey. Do not go on Carey.

CAR: 1912- have all units in the Carey and Baltimore Street area 10-26.

19:08:00

DIS: Ok, cruising patrol 11 be advised that officer is supposed to be hit in the chest. He's on Carey Street. 793 unit. Ambulance is responding.

CAR: 10-4 Do you wish us at Baltimore and Carey?

DIS: They want you at Baltimore and Carey, East of Carey; do not go on Carey at this time.

CAR: 10-4 Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 1930-have all units stand by until CP 11 reaches the Command Post. Seal off the perimeter, we've moved the perimeter back from Baltimore Street and Carey; Have them do the same thing down on Hollins Street.

19:08:30

DIS: The Tactical supervisor is on the scene and they're keeping the people and the officers away from the unit block of Carey.

CAR: Can you get the street lights off down here? Get the street lights out.

(ALERT TONE)

DIS: All units on the scene at Baltimore and Carey or in the vicinity, switch 10-26. Stay on the City-Wide channel.

19:08:50

CAR: 1914. Can I lateral with 1930?

CAR: KGA advise all units the subject is also firing into the rear of the building.

CAR: 1930 is 10-4. 1930 to 1910.

CAR: 1910.

CAR: Do you have any units that can seal off the back of that building?

CAR: I have several units right here on Lombard Street and they can't move. They're not in a position to get out of the way of the guy's gunfire.

CAR: 10-4. I have Baltimore and Carey Streets sealed off. If you can insure the back of the house, we've established a perimeter up here. The Command Post will be on the Eastern side of Carey at Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 10-4. I am at Stockton and Carey.

CAR: You 10-4 on the Command Post?

CAR: 10-9 the location.

CAR: The east side of Baltimore Street, At Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 830 in reference to this call.

CAR: 926- 10-33

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Give me an ambo.

DIS: Unit with the 10-33 only, please.

CAR: 926,-I'm shot Get me an ambo.

DIS: Where are you at, 926?

CAR: In the rear of Lombard Street, behind where the sniper is.

DIS: Rear of Lombard near Carey?

(ALERT TONE- SIMULCAST)

DIS: All units stay out of range of the house, this subject is armed with a high powered rifle. Stay out of range the unit block of south Carey Street. We have several officers who have been shot at this time. Do not respond to Baltimore and Carey unless you're going to the command Post or nearby.

19:10:40

CAR: 830

DIS: 830

CAR: I'm on the second floor of the fire house here. And the suspect is I believe at 1303 West Lombard Street on the third floor, the house with the third floor window open.

DIS: Ok, 830, give me that address again.

CAR: 1303 West Lombard Street. I think that's where he's firing from. I'm on the second floor of the firehouse on Carey Street.

(SIMULCAST)

DIS: Ok, all units be advised- we have information from 830 this subject may possibly be at 1303 West Lombard in the rear, third floor.

CAR: 1914.

DIS: 1914.

CAR: 1914 to 1930.

CAR: 1930 go ahead.

CAR: Sarge, we're directly across the street, there's an abandoned building; when CP 11gets here, you may send him up here. It'll be a clear shot if we have to take this guy out.

CAR: 10-4. Give me an exact location of where you are?

CAR: I have no address, I'm in the back; I'm staying out of the --ah, out of the line of fire here. I'm directly across the street.

CAR: 901, 901, 901 to the Command Post.

DIS: Ok, the unit for the Command Post.

CAR: 901 car.

DIS: You're not at the Command Post, are you?

CAR: Negative. I'm at Carey and Lombard. Have one of those men with gas, report to Carey and Lombard; we may not be able to put gas in this house.

CAR: 1930 10-4. We have the CP here, we're setting up. We'll send it down by foot. I'm gonna leave the CP, the cruising patrol here.

CAR: 10-4

DIS: Ok, 901 can you give me a safe location for an ambulance to stand by there near there?

CAR: 10-4

DIS: 901 go ahead.

CAR: Have an ambo meet me at Carey and Lombard.

DIS: Carey and Lombard, 901; 10-4.

CAR: 935.

CAR: They'll be right in the line of fire.

CAR: 1930 all units at the shooting scene 10-6. We're getting CP 11 in position, we'll have it shortly, just 10-6, seal the perimeter.

CAR: --?-- with a 10-33.

DIS: Unit with a 10-33.

CAR: On the northeast corner of Lombard and Carey I have an officer shot in the arm, needs immediate attention. They can come in behind the bar in the alley.

DIS: Is this Carey and Lombard in the alley on Lombard?

CAR: We're on the northeast corner.

CAR: Be advised if they come in from that direction, they're gonna have to have somebody with armor protection because he's got that whole side of the street covered.

CAR: 2245 in relative to the sniper.

DIS: 901 . All units 10-6. All units 10-6. 901. KGA to 901. 901. 901.

CAR: 901

DIS: They're gonna send the ambulance to Carey and Lombard. You can either intercept them or pick 'em up at that location and then dispatch 'em as you see fit in a safe manner from that location.

CAR: Carey and Lombard is good. Have 'em stand by there.

19:14:30

LOMBARD CAREY3a

Lombard Carey sniper incident

Police officers take shelter behind parked cars at Lombard & Carey streets as they exchange gunfire with the sniper

CAR: 942 for the ambo, 942 for the ambo.

19:14:40

DIS: 942.

CAR: Bring it to Pratt Street. The officers are going down to Pratt Street.

DIS: All units 10-6. 942 you're gonna have to repeat.

CAR: The two injured officers that are shot are going to Pratt Street. Have the ambo respond to Pratt street.

DIS: 901 you Ok?

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 2245 KGA

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: In relative to the shooting, 935 and myself are on the third floor directly across from the sniper. It's 1306 Lombard. Will you get somebody up here with a rifle he could probably fire in that direction, 10-4. We have a shotgun only with the shells itself, no slugs or anything.

CAR: 1930, give me your exact location?

DIS: What is your exact location?

SIMULCAST

DIS: All units please stay off the air. All units wait until you're acknowledged. Too many units are calling 10-33 and you are over ridding each other. 901 is on the scene, we have a Command Post established; please get on City-Wide and wait until you're acknowledged before you give your message.

CAR: 1912 with a 10-33.

DIS: 1912.

CAR: Be advised he's on the second floor. He's breaking the second floor windows out now.

CAR: 1930.

DIS: he's in 1306. He's in 1306, is that correct?

CAR: 2245 - It's either four or six, there'll be an officer in the rear waiting for somebody to come with a rifle.

DIS: Also 901. Give that to Cruising Patrol 11. He's either in 1304 or 6. He has moved to the 2nd. floor at this time.

19:16:40

CAR: 2501.

DIS: 2501, go ahead.

CAR: 2501. I have Unit 9 on the scene with me. The Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey. I have CP 11 responding with one man with a rifle, one man with gas. Give me the exact location to send them.

DIS: 901.

CAR: 901- have them report to Pratt and Lombard.

DIS: Send them to Pratt and Lombard, Sir. Pratt and Lombard.

CAR: 2245 in relative to that man with the rifle and gas. 2245 in relative to the man with the rifle and gas. If he comes to where my 10-20 is, 1304 or six Lombard, he'll have a perfect shot in the direction where the sniper is. 10-4?

CAR: 2501. 10-9 that----

CAR: 2245 I'm at either 1304 or six West Lombard. I'm directly across, I'm on the third floor across from where the sniper is, if the man with the rifle and gas would come to this 10-20 he would have almost a perfect shot into the dwelling.

CAR: 10-4, I'm sending 'em down. You're at either 1304 0r 1306; the sniper man is at 1303 or 1305 is that 10-4?

CAR: That 10-20 is 1303 the sniper. I'm in, I think I'm at four. It might be six. First come to the rear. There'll be an officer to show you, I'm on the third floor.

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: 901 in reference.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Can you send another unit with gas to Pratt and Carey? Report we may pour gas in the rear besides the front.

DIS: That's Cruising Patrol 11 you want at Pratt and Carey

CAR: 1912.

DIS: Go ahead, 1912.

DIS: Sir, be advised we're in the adjoining house directly behind the suspect's house. There are two officers on the second floor, They're in plain clothes.

CAR: That's smart.

CAR: 10-9 that in reference to the police officers, 836 10-9 that message about the police officers being on the roof.

DIS: The unit calling in reference to the two plain clothes men, where are they at?

19:19:00

CAR: 1912 in reference; we're in the house directly behind the suspect house. We're on the second floor rear.

CAR: 901.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 962 in reference to that sniper.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 962 in reference to that sniper.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Be advised, he's on the second floor. Second floor.

CAR: 814 in reference to the sniper.

DIS: 814.

CAR: The sniper..firing at the house on the even side of the 1200 block. He just fired four shots, anybody with a loudspeaker better start yelling for those people.

DIS: Unit 9 switch to channel 9.

CAR: 901 car.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Have all units hold their positions until they can move in with the gas.

DIS: Attention all cars on the scene of the shooting, hold your present position, stay in your present position until Cruising Patrol 11 has established a position.

CAR: 930 in reference, please.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: We have a witness that has an eyewitness view of that sniper shooting, he's in the first house next to the store in the 1300 block of Lombard and that would be on the south side.

SIMULCAST

DIS: Ok in reference to this Carey Street, please wait until you are acknowledged before you go ahead with your message, unless you have an injured officer.

19:20:40

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901 go ahead.

CAR: Ascertain if all the injured have been cared for.

CAR: 2501- 10-4.

DIS: Ok, has 973 been taken care of?

CAR: 2501 to 901.

CAR: 901.

CAR: Do you have the injured officer in sight down there?

CAR: 10-9.

CAR: Do you have the injured officers in sight down there?

CAR: I had two injured officers, they have been taken away in the ambos.

CAR: 2501, 10-4; the injured officers have been taken care of.

CAR: Is that also the one that was on the corner of Carey and Lombard?

CAR: Negative. Negative.

LOMBARD CAREY2a

CAR: 943 in reference.

DIS: All units 10-6. 901 I have information ---this is Radio---I have information that two officers, one from 793 and one from 926. Have they been cared for?

19:21:50

CAR: 926's been cared for---unknown on 793.

CAR: 1930 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead, 1930.

CAR: I escorted two officers; one in two different radio cars, to University Hospital. That's two officers went to University.

CAR: Where they plain clothes?

CAR: No one was in uniform. I couldn't tell if the other one was in plain clothes or uniform. They went in two different radio cars.

CAR: 793-A. My partner was down at Lombard and Carey behind the parked cars. He took a direct hit. Did anybody get him?

DIS: 793, was your partner in plain clothes or uniform?

CAR: Plain clothes, Sir.

CAR: 711 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: We're at the Northeast of Carey and Lombard. We got two officers down; one hit in the arm and one got hit in the chest. We are pinned down; we can't get out.

19:22:50

CAR: 2501 to all units---10-6. Give me your location again. 2501 to that unit, what is your location exactly?

DIS: Lombard and Carey, northeast corner. On Carey Street just north of Lombard; we can't get anybody in or out.

CAR: 10-4.... 10-6, we have help on the way.

CAR: 732 in reference to the ambo.

DIS: 732.

CAR: I got an ambo at Carrollton and Lombard. I think he's on standby.

CAR: Try and get an armored car?

CAR: 1914

CAR:1951 to 2501... 1951 to 2501.

CAR: 830 to 2501 in reference to the injured officers. 830 in reference to the injured officers.

CAR: 747.

DIS: 747

CAR: Be advised I've got four officers in a house directly across the street. We've got a clear shot right into his second floor window if you want to have that EVU wagon come up here, he can gain entrance to the vacant house by coming down Hollins Street in the back.

DIS: All units 10-6. All units. 747, give me the exact location.

CAR: Either 1304 or 1306 Lombard. It's a vacant building and we're on the second floor----no, third floor----- we got a straight shot into his second floor window.

DIS: 2501, you copy this information? They state they have three officers available at 1404 or six West Lombard. They have a direct line of fire for this suspect. They need the EVU Unit at that location.

CAR: 2501 be advised the EVU Unit is en route to that location with gas and a rifle. Have them 10-6; also have they cleared the other side of the two buildings on either side of the building where the sniper is cleared?

DIS: 901.... 901.

CAR: 795....795.....795 in reference to the injured officers.

DIS: 901, do you know if they cleared both sides of that building?

CAR: Uncertain on that Sir.

DIS: What unit has the Cruising Patrol 11?

CAR: 2501 Cruising Patrol 11 is here. We have two Cruising Patrol people on the way down with 1951.

DIS: 747, you are at 1304 or six West Lombard? Is that correct?

CAR: 10-4. We got a shotgun in the building and if they are gonna come down they can get in the back way. There's an officer gonna show 'em the way in.

DIS: 2501, they want Cruising 11 to respond to the rear of, it's either 1304 or six, there is an officer in the rear; he will show 'em where to come in. They come in the rear, they're directly opposite 1303 where that subject has now went back to the third floor.

CAR: 1914 in reference.

CAR: 830 in reference to these injured officers.

DIS: Go ahead, 830.

CAR: They're on the northeast corner of Carey Street and Lombard. They're behind the blue and white van. Now we got to get these men out of here somehow or another.

DIS: 2501.... All units 10-6. The Command Post will handle this. 10-6.....2501.

19:26:50

CAR: 2501.

DIS: The injured officers are trapped, the northeast corner of Carey and Lombard. They're behind a blue and white van; they can't get 'em out at this time. Can you handle this?

CAR: 2501... I am sending a team down. The team is en route now.

DIS: Ok, all units be advised. There is a team en route to Carey and Lombard to assist the injured officers.....10-6 unless you have emergency information.

CAR: 801.

DIS: Go ahead, 801

CAR: 801 -----10-32 this location. Information from the duty officer we have enough men present.

DIS: You want to 10-32 Carey and Lombard, you want no more units to respond?

19:27:40

DIS: Be advised we getting more injured officers

CAR: 1917 to 2501 be advised one block west the 1300 block civilians are still getting through. They're still coming down here.

Can you seal it off? we had a guy ride down the middle of the street on a bike.

DIS: All units, special attention to 2501 and 901. Any injured police you can get 'em, take 'em to Carrollton and Lombard. There's a Battalion Chief there with ambulance crews to transport same.

CAR: 830 in reference to this sniper.

DIS: Go ahead, 830.

CAR: I'm going to the firehouse and I have 1964 unit from Tactical here with me. And they have a clear fire of the window where the sniper is. And we're over-looking the two injured officers here.

CAR: 2501 to 1951....2501 to the C.P.

19:28:50

CAR: Are you with the man with the rifle?

CAR: 10-4...Permission to fire when ready.

CAR: Permission is granted. Unit 9 has granted permission, fire when you have a clear field to fire.

CAR: 1940, He's moved to the third floor again.

CAR: 2187 in reference.

CAR: 2501. All units 10-6. 2501 to 901.

CAR: 901.

CAR: The people that are sealing the perimeter on Lombard Street. as I understand there was a bicycle that came down the middle of it. Can you send a couple more people to see that that doesn't happen?

CAR: I just sent another man up there on that.

CAR: 10-4 Thank-you Would you report that to the Command Post?

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 2187.

DIS: 2187.

 LOMBARD CAREY3a

CAR: Be advised sir, I'm positioned up high and in the back alley. There is glass breaking out of the back part of one of those buildings; it may be him in one of those buildings. Glass just broke up there.

CAR: 836 in reference.

CAR: That's me. That ain't him, that's me.

DIS: That's 836 car, use caution; be aware of other officers and several plain clothes men are on the scene.

CAR: Don't go into that building unless cleared from the Command Post.

CAR: 1901, do you have a landline you can get me a number on, Joe?

CAR: 10-6 for a minute.

CAR: 1914.

DIS: 1914.

CAR: sir, we're in the building directly across the street, we have a shotgun and a clear line of fire. did you say permission to fire was granted?

19:30:50

CAR: 2501... That is 10-4. Permission to fire is granted when you have a clear field to fire. We're trying to establish land line communications with 2284.

CAR: 10-4. We're directly across the street with a shotgun, clear line of fire and when we get a target we're gonna open up.

CAR: That is 10-4.

CAR: 2501 to KGA.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: On the roof of the firehouse with 1964 unit. When the other unit opens fire we can open fire. You can send an ambulance to get that other officer out of here. This guy is gonna die.

19:31:40

CAR: 2501. 10-4 we'll have an ambulance standing by. KGA, have an ambulance 10-11 2501 at Carrollton and Baltimore Street.

CAR: 962, get someone to fire on that dude.....he is tearing up the car with this officer hiding behind it.

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Advise any units if they have a clear shot, to fire at him. He's firing at the police that are pinned down.

CAR: 2501to all units. The only unit that is to fire is the sniper.....?...10-6 all units.

DIS: 2501 advise all units do not fire. Only the sniper units.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: I have a unit up on top of the firehouse here. 1964 has got rifle slugs. How about permission to put 'em in there?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: All right, all units, 10-6 on the fire. Do not fire until 2501 gives the word. They want to make sure they get the injured officer. They're sending in a team at this time and when they're in position they'll give you the information.

19:33:00

CAR: 2501 to KGA......2501 to 1956.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 830.

CAR: The officer that's hit in the chest is lying beside a yellow Pinto wagon. Negative, alongside the blue and white van.

CAR: 2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956 standing by.

CAR: What is your 10-20?

CAR: We are at the alley, 1200 block of West Lombard, waiting for instructions.

CAR: Can you see the injured officers?

CAR: 830 in reference.

CAR: 2501--go ahead.

CAR: All right now, this officer that's shot in the chest, he's in front of a green Dodge. It's the third car up from the corner on Carey Street. There's a blue and white wagon with two officers behind it. A blue and white van and there's a yellow Pinto station wagon with one officer behind it and the next car up is a green Dodge with a black vinyl top and that officer's lying alongside it. That's the one that's hit in the chest. Also they think he is dead at this time.

19:34:40

CAR: 2245 to KGA. 2245 KGA.

DIS: 2245.

CAR: If you have a unit with a shotgun...shoot that street light out, and it'd give us some darkness maybe to get that officer out from there. The street light is too light. Have 'em shoot that light out.

CAR: 1951. Negative. 10-6,....10-6---?----He's blowing that light out.

CAR: 2501. 10-4. All units disregard the last. All units disregard the last.

CAR: 830, have 'em hold their fire.

DIS: All units, 830 advises do not fire at this time.

CAR: The lights are out now, but there's a lot of people down on the corner.

CAR: Let's get the officers out, for Christ sake.

CAR: 2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956.

CAR: Do you know where the officers are now?

CAR: 10-4.... On Carey Street up on Carey. Three cars up.

CAR: Can you see them? Can you reach them?

CAR: We cannot see them from here. We have to change our location to an alley up the street here.

CAR: 10-4. 2401 to 1956.

CAR: 1956 standing by.

CAR: If I give you cover fire, can you reach those officers?

CAR: 10-6.... I'll go around there and determine that.

CAR: 1901 to the Command Post.

CAR: 2501 standing by.

CAR: Joe, I have the gas man with me; we went across Carey Street. Can you get a couple of those guys to give me a burst of fire so we can get across?

CAR: Lieutenant, you're giving me too much radio. I can't hear anything you said.

DIS: All units 10-6. They want you to repeat slowly, please.

CAR: 2501 to 1901, give me that again.

CAR: Just a second, Joe.

CAR: Cut one of the radios off. Lieutenant and I can't hear you.

DIS: 1901, can you repeat your information to 2501?

19:37:20

CAR: 1901. I need a base of fire for a couple guys to throw a few rounds, at the front of that place so we can get across Carey Street and have a better shot to throw some gas in there.

DIS: 2501.

CAR: to any unit across the street from 1301 Carey-----{ERROR}

CAR: 1912 and 1340.

CAR: Put down some cover fire when I give you the word.

CAR: 10-4, we're ready.

CAR: 1901.

DIS: All units 10-6 till 2501 gives them word for cover fire.

CAR: 830 in reference.

DIS: All units 10-6

CAR: 10-33 in reference to the sniper.

CAR: 2501 to 1901.

DIS: All units 10-6, until 1901 and 2501 get their cover fire.

CAR: 2501 to 1901. I will give the word for cover fire. When you hear the fire proceed.

CAR: 10-4 ready.

CAR: 2501 to 1912. 1914 throw in fire in that location.

CAR: Right now?

19:38:20

CAR: 10-4 NOW.

CAR: 2501 to 1901.....2501 to 1901....2501 to 1901.....2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956.

CAR: 1956, what's your location now; can you get down to the officer?

CAR: 2501 to all units on the scene, 10-22 any further firing, 10-22 any further firing.

19:39:10

CAR: 1901 to Command Post.

CAR: Command Post.

CAR: Can you give us the location where those Western officers said they had a good shot at the front of it?

CAR: Talk slower, Lieutenant; I can't understand you.

DIS: 10-6 a minute. 1901, is that in reference to 1304 or six West Lombard?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: I believe that was 747 unit. He said they have an officer in the back that will show 'em where to go.

CAR: They got all the wounded officers.

CAR: 1956 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: Be advised, Sir, I'm with one of the injured officers now; there's another one we have to get to, it's about one car further south than I am.

CAR: 10-4, advise me when you can evacuate those officers and I'll throw in cover fire for you; can you do that?

CAR: 10-4. We can get one out right away. If you throw fire as soon as I get another officer to help me drag him out.

CAR: 2501...you can get the officer out, if you have cover fire?

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: 10-4, advise me when.

CAR: 2501 to 1912.

CAR: 1912.

CAR: 10-6 there, when I give you the word, throw in more cover fire. Do you need ammunition?

CAR: 10-4, Sir.

CAR: Is that officer right in front of the house across from that car? I'm close.

CAR: 2187, 2187; be advised I'm directly across the street right above the guy too, right across Lombard Street.

CAR: Is he behind that blue car?

CAR: He's behind the blue car across the street.

CAR: 2187....I'm above him on top of the house.

19:41:10

CAR: 830 to 2501, they got a couple of the officers out.

19:41:30

CAR: 836 in reference.

CAR: 2501. Go ahead.

CAR: All right, we got 'em in a green, a green van. And the rest of 'em are still over here.

CAR: 2501, you're gonna have to slow down and talk so that I can understand you.

CAR: 1956 to 2501. We have one officer out, still one down.

CAR: 2501, 10-4. Can you get the officer out with cover fire?

CAR: 10-4, if you got plenty of it.....10-6 a minute, we'll give you the word when we're ready.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: 830; I have three Tactical officers up here on top the firehouse. Now let us know when you want cover fire, and I have a clear view of the other injured officer down there.

CAR: 10-4-----?--- I'm sending ammunition down to 1306.

CAR: 1107.

DIS: 1107.

CAR: 1107 to Homicide Unit. I got the man shot in the chest. I'm gonna need an ambo to take him to the hospital. We are now clear at Pratt and Carey. Now clear at Pratt and Carey.

19:42:30

DIS: 1107 has the officer clear with the shot in the chest. You're taking him away now?

CAR: ---?---, the officer's clear.

CAR: Get to Hollins and Stockton. Send him to Hollins and Stockton.

CAR: 746......(several cars talking, unable to understand anything)....An officer hit down at Stockton Street. Stockton and Lombard,

DIS: Stockton and Lombard; you have another injured officer?

19:43:00

CAR: Stockton off of Hollins, have 'em come to Hollins Street. I'll get---?---?----

DIS: All units 10-6, we have the information, Stockton and Lombard, we have another injured officer.

CAR: 795 in reference, have that ambo come to Stockton and Hollins. I'll direct him in, just get him up here.

DIS: Be advised the man now using the radio; we cannot understand you. Your gonna have to speak slower.

19:43:30

CAR: Ok....Direct that ambo to Hollins and Stockton. I'll direct him in, Hollins and Stockton.

DIS: Ok, we realize the situation at Hollins and Stockton for the ambulance for the injured officer.

(Several cars talking)

CAR: 2501 to all units, 10-6....... 2501 to the officer at Stockton and Lombard......2501 to any officer at Stockton and Lombard.

DIS: The officer on the scene is that Hollins and Stockton you want?

CAR: 10-4..... Hollins and Stockton Street, this man is hurt bad.

DIS: KGA to 2501, All units 10-6,....All units 10-6. ...2501 only.

CAR: 2501 to the unit at Stockton and Lombard Can that abbo get in there without going under fire?

CAR: We got him now, we got him now.

DIS: KGA to all units,...10-6....All units,...10-6, Stay off the radio.....2501 ONLY.

CAR: 2501.

DIS: We have a subject on the phone, states he is the suspect, his name is John Williams, he says stop firing, he wants to surrender. He's at 1303 West Lombard, His name is John Williams.

CAR: 2501 to KGA......Advise that suspect to come out of the house with his hands up in the air, absolutely no weapons in his hands. Advise any units on the scene to 10-22 any firing. Let that suspect come out of the house.

19:45:20

DIS: All units.......All units hold your fire. ...All units hold your fire.

CAR: (unknown): Shoot him.

CAR: (unknown): Waste him.

CAR: 2187 in reference to that, please.

DIS: 2187.

CAR: 10-4, I have information from a citizen, this man's name was Jimmy Burrough..... This is at 1306. All units use Caution.

SIMULCAST

19:45:40

CAR: 2501 to all units; stand by until we get in position.

DIS: KGA to all units; be advised, this subject is supposed to be a John Williams, he's at 1303 West Lombard. He states that he's now in the basement, he wants to surrender; 2501 advises all officers hold your fire.

CAR: 2501 to KGA.

DIS: 2501 Only.

CAR: You still have land line with that man?

CAR: 1901 to Command Post.

CAR: Command Post 2501 standing by.

Car: We're in a position to throw some gas in there, Joe.

If you can, give us a base of fire to give us some cover for the man to get over the edge of this roof.

CAR: 10-4....10-6 ....just one minute, Lieutenant....10-6....2501 to KGA.

CAR: Unit 9, will you tell 'em to keep the line clear.

DIS: We have an officer on the telephone that states this is the suspect and he's gonna advise him to come out of the building with with his hands raised, nothing in his hands.

CAR: 2501.....10-4, advise him to lay down on the street when he comes out of that building.......to lay down on the ground.

CAR: Cover the rear door, Joe.

19:47:00

CAR: 2501 to KGA......Have him come out of the building.

DIS: 10-4

CAR: All units...10-6 on any fire...All units

CAR: 748

DIS: 748.

CAR: Have CP 11 come down Stockton Street to Lombard. The Command Post wants him down here.

CAR: 1951 to 2501... Be advised the man's out of the house, two officers have him in custody, have all other men stay away from the house.

19:47:30

CAR: 2501 to all

SIMULCAST

DIS: Attention from the officer, there's two officers have the suspect in custody

Two officers have the suspect in custody, all officers are to stay away from the scene. All weapons are supposed to have been left on the third floor of 1303 west Lombard.

19:47:50

END

Devider

Officer Robert Brown, Western District, was off duty and sitting on his porch when the shots rang out that night. He responded to the sounds of the shots being fired to assist with the incident. The suspect Johnnie Earl Williams was taken into custody, and Motor Officer Pete Richter lead the way to the paddy wagon for transport to the Homicide Unit.

Devider

LOMBARD CAREY4a

POLICE DEPARTMENT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Communications Division

Transcript

450 Mhz

Western District Dispatcher
16 April 1976
Time: 18:59:40

DISP: {SIMULCAST by City-Wide}

CAR: ----?---- 10-23

CAR: 793.

DIS: 793.

19:00:10

CAR: We're responding to that 13 on Carey Street.

CAR: 714 get some shotgun units down here.

DIS: Any units responding stay off Carey Street.

{SIMULCAST, same, City-Wide}

19:00:40

CAR: 713

DIS: 713. Units on the scene, it's supposed to be on the southwest corner, the second house.

(SIMULCAST, SAME)

19:01:20

CAR: 746-- I'm going on City-Wide for Carey Street

CAR: 710.

DIS: 710.

CAR: Advise the units on City-Wide and direct traffic going eastbound on Baltimore. Also have one at Carrollton, direct westbound traffic. We also need another one at Carey and Fayette diverting southbound till this thing's clear. 10-4?

DIS: I don't have anything to send there now, they're down there on Carey.

CAR: 772. I'll take Calhoun and Baltimore.

19:03:20

( SIMULCAST, City-Wide, ....of Unit 9)

19:03:40

CAR: 713 with a 10-33.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 713 with an officer shot; an officer has been shot at the unit block of Carey Street.

DIS: That's in front of the engine house on Carey Street?

CAR: The officer's shot bad.

DIS: Ok, an ambulance will be notified. All Units 10-6 until we get Carey Street cleared up. All Units 10-6

19: 04:10

CAR: ---?--- in reference.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: ---?--- the subject is supposed to be in an alley close to the firehouse.

DIS: Give that information to City-Wide, for a City-Wide broadcast, also.

CAR: 710, see if you can ascertain who it is.

DIS: We don't mention any name on the air.

CAR: 762's on the scene.

DIS: 10-9.

CAR: 762's on the scene.

DIS: Any unit on the scene at the firehouse on Carey Street.

CAR: ---?---

DIS: Let me have the ranking officer on this channel.

19:05:30

CAR: 703.

DIS: 703

CAR: I'm the ranking officer Sir, do you have any ambo on the way?

DIS: That's correct, an ambo's on the way. If you have any information in reference to the subject's.......?

DIS: (SIMULCAST "heavily armed" info)

19:05:50

DIS: 703

CAR: 703.

CAR: 713.

DIS: 713

CAR: I'd like permission to throw a large amount of fire to evacuate this wounded officer.

DIS: 713 car.

CAR: 713.

DIS: Have you got the officer out of the area?

CAR: We're pinned down; anybody can get a clear shot at the building, start taking it, so we can move that officer.

19:07:00

CAR: 713.

DIS: 713.

CAR: We're pinned down in front of....

CAR: 711.

DIS: 711.

CAR: Advise I'm pinned down in front of the fire station. I've got an officer here, he's been hit in the upper part of his chest. He's bleeding very badly. We can't get anybody in or out right now.

DIS: 711.....711 car.

CAR: 711.

DIS: Are you able to get to the officer?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: Do you have the officer?

CAR: I'm holding his arm.

DIS: 10-9 the message.

CAR: He's holding his own, now.

CAR: 710.

DIS: 710.

CAR: Ascertain from 11 if he's got that officer.

DIS: 711 car.

CAR: 10-4, keep everybody out of the unit block of Carey.

DIS: Ok, all units.

(SIMULCAST to 10-26 City-Wide)

19:09:00

DIS: Any units on the scene in the unit block of south Carey clear the alley, clear the alley.

19:10:00

(Simulcast -- same)

19:10:30

(Simulcast-- same again)

19:11:20

DIS: 745....743....746.

19:14:50

(SIMULCAST, "stay off air")

19:15:00

CAR: 745.

DIS: 745.

19:17:30

CAR: 745....746...748...will be on City-Wide.

CAR: 732.

DIS: 732.

CAR: We're also on the scene, we'll be City-Wide.

CAR: 770.

DIS: 770.

CAR: Have 771 and 781....10-11 Baltimore and Carey to direct traffic.

DIS: DIS: 771 and 770.... They probably back to City-Wide now. We broadcast any units in the area to go City -Wide.

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 783.

DIS: 783

CAR: Hold me 10-7 Fayette and Calhoun.

DIS: 10-4

19:19:40

CAR: 761

DIS: 761

19:20:00

CAR: Sir, in reference to the shooting incident, there is two officers in uniform that are going up on the roof on the even side of South Carey Street.

DIS: Give that info to City-Wide.

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 713.

DIS: 713.

19:23:00

CAR: I cannot get through on City-Wide. Have 714 unit ---?--- at Lombard and Carey on the northwest corner. He needs an ambulance.

Northeast corner, northeast corner..He needs an ambo.

DIS: Northeast corner of Carey and Lombard, you need an ambo?

CAR: 10-4, I can't get through on City-Wide.

DIS: Ok. 19:23:20

19:23:50

DIS: 713,....713, any unit on the scene at Carey and Lombard....713....713, any unit on the scene at Carey and Lombard, is it safe for that ambulance to come through?

CAR: 761 in reference.

DIS: 761.

CAR: 10-47. (negative)

DIS: You say it's negative, you say it's not safe for him to come through.

CAR: 10-4. it is not at this time, this guy's still shooting.

CAR: 795.

DIS: 795.

CAR: See if 793-A is on this channel.

DIS: 793,...793.

CAR: We can't get in on City-Wide. We got an ambulance crew standing by at Pratt and Carey, and they are wondering how they can get up to the injured officers. Is there any way possible to get up there.

19:26:00

DIS: 10-6 a moment, we're trying to find that out now....761,...761...795.

CAR (7)95.

DIS: Where do you have the ambulance?

CAR: Carey and Pratt Street.

DIS: 10-6 on this channel a moment.

DIS: 795....795.

CAR: (7)95. I got the ambulance crew, we walking up towards Lombard; we'll be standing by Lombard and Carey with the ambulance crew.

19:27:40

DIS: Ok, use extreme caution up there.

CAR: 10-4... Can you tell me where the officer is?

DIS: The information we have, the officers are behind a blue and white van on the northeast corner of Carey and Lombard. Use extreme caution, though, that subject is still firing up there.

19:32:00

DIS: 745, 746, 743, 742 (all called , no response)

CAR: 795.

DIS: 795.

CAR: See if you can locate an ambo crew. I think we can get 'em in there if you can locate one ---?--- at Lombard and Carey.

19:33:00

DIS: 795, 795.

CAR: 795.

19:34:00

DIS: 795, 795 go ahead.

CAR: 795, 795.

19:41:00

DIS: Unit calling 10-9.

CAR: ---?--- we got the officer.

DIS: where do you want the ambo?

CAR: Have the ambo come down Lombard Street, Pratt Street. Have 'em come down Hollins Street. Hollins and Stricker.

DIS: Any unit can make the officer out, 10-9.

CAR: 795, Dispatcher, dispatch the ambo crew to Stockton and Hollins. On the double, on the double.

DIS: What's your 10-20, 795, I can't make you out.

CAR: Stockton: Stockton and Hollins. I'm gonna transport one officer myself. Have 'em get here to Stockton and Hollins......

19:42:20

DIS: 795, be advised the ambo is en-route....795 the ambo is en-route.

19:4240

(SIMULCAST, Surrender, City-Wide)

19:45:40

*END*


The foregoing five pages were reduced to typewritten form by Lieutenant Herbert F. Armstrong, after data was taken from tapes by Officer Ignace Thibodeaux.

Lombard Carey aa

POLICE DEPARTMENT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Communications Division

Southern and Southwestern District Dispatcher

450 Mhz

16, April 1976

Time: 18:59:00

CAR: 1924, 1924.

DIS: 1944.

CAR: Be advised we got shooting at police cars in the area of Boyd and---?----.

DIS: Boyd and what?

CAR: 2245. It's Carey and Lombard. It appears to be on Lombard Street. I believe it may be on the 2nd. floor.

DIS: Lombard. Ok, what hundred block of Lombard?

CAR: Carey and Lombard.

CAR: It's Lombard by the confectionary store.

18:59:30

DIS: SIMULCAST 18:59:40

CAR: 962 responding. 31's on the way, 922 right around the corner.... 926 we're responding.

SIMULCAST


19:00:00

CAR: 926; 812.

DIS: All units 10-6........ anyone injured?

CAR: 2245...... I'm there too......2245. Advise those cars they are in the line of fire.

CAR: 930's on the scene. 19:00:30

DIS: 901,...901.

CAR: 901.

CAR: 922. Get 'em out Carey and Lombard.

CAR: 901's responding.

DIS: SIMULCAST 19:00:40

CAR: 922.....I'm at Carey and Lombard...That's------?------ off-duty Western Man...He's in the 3rd. floor second house from the corner.

CAR: 2246 responding.

CAR: Information coming from a citizen...it's supposed to be a broken up on top the second or third floor...----?--- they're coming from.

CAR: 922.....on the way, he's supposed to get the shotgun.

CAR: 935's got a shotgun.

CAR: 912 responding with a shotgun.

CAR: 912 responding with a shotgun.

CAR: 930 in reference.

19:01:30

DIS: Go ahead, you have the airway.

CAR: 930....Be advised we have a situation down here in the unit block of south Carey Street...We have shots being fired from ----?--- ----?---- west side of Carey Street, unknown right now.

DIS: Ok, 10-4...901's responding also, we're trying to get CP 11 also to responding. Also be advised City-Wide advises a plain clothes car radiator has been damaged to that shooting.

CAR: 830's on the scene. 19:02:00

DIS: Ok.

DIS: All units keep the air waves clear in case of an emergency, if you need assistance, use the airways...All units 10-6 till the emergency is clear.

CAR: 931....

DIS: SIMULCAST 19:02:30

CAR: 922...----?----.

DIS: 10-4.

CAR: We got an open door we can almost see into the house. Is anybody in the back?

CAR: 31 and two other units back here with a shotgun, they ain't going nowhere.

CAR: 962 with a 10-33; he's shooting out the window.

CAR: 911. We got an injured man here; he's been shot.

DIS: What's the location?

CAR: In front of the fire station.

DIS: Ok, 10-4 19:03:20

CAR: 926. Any unit on the scene, do you know where they're shooting from?

CAR: 922. It's the house right next to the grocery store. There's a pocketbook on the porch.

CAR: Is that by----?----?

DIS: SIMULCAST

19:03:40

CAR: ........ and Carey at the Gulf Station.

DIS: Ok, where's the injured officer, where's the injured officer?

CAR: Pratt and Carey. Get the ambulance down here.

DIS: Give me a location.

CAR: 962.

DIS: Go ahead 962.

CAR: There's somebody else shooting around here other than this guy.

DIS: yeah.... You got 930 set up a command post... 930 set up a command post and give me a location.

CAR: ---?--- Hollins and Carey Street, Hollins and Carey Street, in the ah-- the ah-- gas station lot.

DIS: The command post is located at Hollins and Carey You have gulf Station Lot.... Where's the injured officer?

CAR: ---?--- at Lombard and Carey, we can't get close.

19:04:40

DIS: You say the officer is pinned down?

CAR: 901 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 2245, stand by, because I'm directly across from the sniper. I'm up on the north side of Carey Street, directly across from his firing. If you can have someone with a rifle come up here, they might be able to get him out.

DIS: 2245 are you injured?

CAR: 2245. Be advised I'm directly across the street from the sniper; I'm about even with his line of fire. We need somebody with a rifle. I only have a revolver.

DIS: Do you know the address, 2245, where the sniper's at?

19:05:30

CAR: 1303 Carey Street, on the 3rd. floor, there's a window open.

CAR: 901. CAR: 962.

DIS: All units 10-6. 2245, can you give us more information?

CAR: Negative. I can't look outside. I'm right in his line of fire, but the address that I can see is 1303 Lombard Street.

DIS: 10-4

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901, go ahead.

CAR: ---?--- on the scene switch to City-Wide. I'm going to City-Wide.

CAR: 962.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Be advised it sounds like he possible has a rifle type weapon here. It's a possibly a Winchester he keeps reloading.

DIS: 10-4.

CAR: 831. Advise those units he's got the whole unit block of Carey covered up there from that roof top.

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901, go ahead.

CAR: Advise that we have all streets blocked off, now.

DIS: Ok, all units be advised all streets in the unit block of Carey Street vicinity are blocked off.

19:07:30

Car: 930.

DIS: 930.

CAR: Have CP11 respond to Hollins and Carey, 10-4?

DIS: 10-4.

SIMULCAST re: Command Post broadcast


19:07:50

CAR: 972,...972.

DIS: Go ahead 972.

CAR: He just fired up Carey Street toward the firehouse, the shots are going up that way.

DIS: 10-4, where's the exact location of that injured?

CAR: 972.

DIS: Go ahead 972.

CAR: He just shot a police car in the unit block of South Carey.

DIS: We're aware of that 972. Where's the injured officer? We want to know where the injured officer's located?

19:08:50

CAR: 10-33, 10-30.

DIS: Go ahead with the emergency.

(Several units talking re 10-33 in 100 block south Carey)

CAR: A Police hit over here.

CAR: 941.

CAR: There's two officers hit. 100 block South Carey, Carey in the rear of that house.

CAR: 921, 921.

DIS: 921.

CAR: The suspect across the street on top of the roof, behind squashing the firehouse. He went back behind his squashing the firehouse; the other officer's in the alley; you better have 'em clear out.

DIS: The suspect's on the roof across the street from the firehouse. All units, the suspect is on the roof across from the firehouse. Any units in the alley clear.

19:09:50

(SIMULCAST, "STAY out of range......")

19:10:40

CAR: 836.

DIS: 836.

CAR: Have all those other units switch to City-Wide. We have some still on this channel. Ok.

DIS: Ok. All units on the scene at Carey Street, 10-26, 10-26.

(SIMULCAST)


19:11:20

CAR: 847.

DIS: 847.

19:11:40

CAR: I got a shotgun. I'm at Pratt and Monroe. You want me go to the Command Truck?

DIS: Go ahead, 847. Go ahead to the Command Post. On the way, stay off of Carey Street.

CAR: 10-4, I'm going down Pratt.

DIS: Be advised that suspect is armed with a high-powered rifle...Stay out of his range.

CAR: 922.

DIS: 922

CAR: Have the Ambulance come down.

DIS: 10-9 unit reference to that ambulance.10-9 your information.

CAR: 910.

DIS: 910.

CAR: I'm responding. I have a carbine and a shotgun.

DIS: Be advised stay away from Carey Street. The command post is at Carey and Hollins.

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: Injured Officer.

CAR: 831,...831.

DIS: 831.

CAR: Be advised 830's on the scene. Could you ascertain from him if he can meet us at the command post?

DIS: 830, 830. All units are on City-Wide Channel. 831.

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: 933. I'm transporting an injured officer to University. Notify them.

19:16:00

DIS: Ok, 10-4, 933.

CAR: 962.

CAR: 962

19:19:10

CAR: Be advised that sniper's on the second floor now. Second floor.

DIS: Ok, give that 10-26, give it to City-Wide.

CAR: 943.

DIS: 943.

19:20:20

CAR: Be advised there's two officers injured from that skirmish at University.

DIS: 10-4. 943 go back to City-Wide and advise them.

CAR: 10-4

19:21:20

CAR: 933.

DIS: 933.

19:26:20

DIS: They still have two officers pinned down. Right now there's none on the way to University. They're still pinned down. They can't get to them.

19:27:30

CAR: Ok, I'll advise the hospital and have a team stand by. Ok?

DIS: 10-4.

DIS: Ok, we got a person injured in the street, 1521 W. Pratt.

DIS: 922. 923.

CAR: 923.

DIS: Ok, 1521 West Pratt advise how close that is to Carey.

CAR: About three blocks.

DIS: We have a person lying in the street at that location. See how close you can get to it. 922 advise if you can't make it.

CAR: 10-4.

19:28:20

SIMULCAST

19:45:40

DIS: .....Hold your fire.

SIMULCAST

19:47:40

DIS: SURRENDER

* END *

The foregoing seven pages were reduced to typewritten form by Lieutenant Herbert F. Armstrong after data was taken from Communications Division tapes by Officer Ignance Thibodeaux.         

POLICE DEPARTMENT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Transcript

16, April 1976

Telephone Position No. 19

Centrex

"Surrender"

CENTREX: Police Department.

CALLER: Ma'am?

CENTREX : Police Department.

CALLER: Listen: they're shooting at me.

CENTREX: Who's shooting at you?

CALLER: The police.

CENTREX: Where are you?

CALLER: I'm the person at 1303, just tell 'em I'm coming out, just don't shoot me.

CENTREX: Oh, come on.

CALLER: I'm not playing, Miss.

CENTREX: You are, cause I hear people talking in the background.

CALLER: Miss.......

CNTREX: Well, let me give you the Sergeant in Radio, then.

(Telephone Position No.13. 396-2284)

OIC: Communications, Officer Arnold.

CALLER: Call 'em up, just do anything, tell 'em to quite shooting at me. I'm coming out of the house peacefully.

OIC: Who is this?

Caller: 1303West Lombard Street.

OIC: Where? You're coming out peaceful?

CALLER: YES, they were shooting at me 'cause I was firing back; but gonna surrender, I'm giving up. They won't listen to me.

OIC: Uh-huh.

CALLER: Just tell 'em to let me come out by myself, please.

OIC: All right, what's your name, Pal?

Caller: Sir?

What's your name?

CALLER: John Earl Williams.

OIC: John Earl Williams?

CALLER: Yes, Sir ALL youse gotta do is get on the phone but do something, contact 'em.

OIC: uh-huh, I'll contact 'em all right, what's your address there?

CALLER: 1303. They're all around me, I just give up. West Lombard.

OIC: All right, you just stop shooting now. I'll take care of it.

CALLER: just tell 'em, tell 'em to yell, tell me to come out. I'm coming out, please.

OIC: All right. How many shots did you fire?

Caller: Oh, my God, I don't know. I'm giving up.

OIC: uh-All right, John. I'll take care of you. Hold on the line, here.

CALLER: Ok, Ok.

19:43:20

19:45:10

OIC: You still there, John?

CALLER: Yes.

OIC: Huh?

Caller: Yes, Sir.

OIC: Ok, go out the front of the house.

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: Put your hands in the air, no weapons.

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: Dump all your weapons.

CALLER: Yes, Sir, I ain't got nuttin.

OIC: All right?

CALLER: I ain't got nothing, they're all on the third floor and I'm in the basement.

OIC: You're in the basement?

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: hold on.

19:45:30

OIC: All right, go ahead out, John; put your hands in the air.

CALLER: Please don't tell me a lie. I don't want to get shot.

OIC: They won't shoot you.. You got my word it they won't shoot you.

CALLER: They are firing at me.

OIC: What's the phone number there, John?

CALLER: Sir?

OIC: What's the phone number there?

CALLER: 752.

OIC: 752--Huh, what's the number?

CALLER 7646.

OIC: 7646.

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: All right, John, go out the front door. Go out the front door, put your hands in the air, leave all your weapons.

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: And you are in the basement?

CALLER: Yes, Sir.

OIC: All right, go ahead, John

CALLER: Officer, Officer.......

OIC: Go ahead, John, you won't be shot.

OIC: John......John.....John......(He ain't on there any more).

19:46:50

*END*

(Taken off tape by Officer Ignace M. Thibodeaux, Communications)

Reduced to typewritten form by Lt. Herbert F. Armstrong 4/17/1976

NOTE- Centrex operator was Senior Telephone Operator Betty Linn; O-I-C on position 13 was Police Officer Richard Arnold.

For a Detailed History of QRT / SWAT Click Here

Devider

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Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Quick Response Team

Saturday, 14 March 2020 13:39

Quick Response Team
We Were Cops Once . . . and Young

Brief History of the Baltimore Police Department Quick Response Teams
By Ret Lt. Joe Key

                                         

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The history of QRT is written large by many of its members then and now. Contributing to that history and to the writing of this history were: (In alphabetical order) Doug Bryson, Steve Coughlan, Paul Davis, David Datsko, Steve Kuhn, John Maguire, Mike Mulligan, Ed Schillo, Sam Tress, and Curtis Willis. These men took time out from very busy schedules to provide their recollection of milestones, salient events, dates, and photos of that history. Each contributed mightily when they were in the teams and did so as well to this writing. Also, others I couldn’t contact deserve recognition for their contribution to bringing the teams and their equipment into the 21th century. Eventually, through the determined efforts of men like John Christian, Jerry DeManss, Bob Edwards, Don Healy, Ray Jones, Bob Letmate, John Lewandowski, Jan Richmond and unsung others, the Baltimore Police Department’s SWAT teams were turned into an internationally recognized, professional unit worthy of any police department in the world.

My own efforts in starting QRT were minimal in comparison to some, if not all, of these men. I just happened to be in the right place and had, according to some supporters and opponents alike, the bullish temperament and unyielding nature that was required at the beginning to keep the sometimes square wheels from totally falling off the QRT machine long enough for the program to endure. The aforementioned men took that humble start and turned it into what it has become today. It was an honor to have worked with them and a privilege to write about what their efforts have achieved.

PROLOGUE

With apologies to Lt. General Harold Moore for co-opting, in part, the title of his book about the 7th Calvary’s insertion into the la Drang Valley in Vietnam in 1965, the nearing of the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Baltimore Police Department’s Quick Response Teams has caused me to reflect back on that time and the good men who went above and beyond the call of duty to drag the department into a new and necessary element of policing in the 20th Century. I’m certainly not comparing the sacrifices of the troops of the 7th Calvary on the battlefield to the trials and tribulations of those first QRT officers. While those first officers did face dangerous situations with inferior equipment and minimal training, their main battle was one of survival in a department which was staffed by a command element, except for an important few, and rank and file officers who became apoplectic at even the whispered thought of SWAT being amongst them. Those men’s willingness to train in their off-duty time, spend their own money to buy equipment, and suffer the constant derisive comments by brother officers laid a foundation for the outstanding unit QRT/SWAT has become. The following quote from Theodore Roosevelt’s "The Man In The Arena" speech at the Sorbonne in Paris, France on April 23, 1910 applies to those men and to their critics as well:

It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.

One factor that caused a measure of resentment/jealousy by command and the rank and file was the portrayal of SWAT cops in the 70's television program “SWAT.” Even the name connoted violence; i.e., to crush a fly with a single swat. The program exaggerated the image of the operators as being glory boys whose main job was to lift weights, run endless loops through obstacle courses, jump off of buildings or out of perfectly good helicopters, suck down copious amounts of CS gas without blinking, play with various guns, and generally look good for the cameras when they leaped out of the back of a large, black, armored, very menacing looking, truck with guns blazing. Admittedly, some of those activities–excluding jumping out of trucks with guns blazing, etc.–were a necessary part of the job and attracted candidates who were drawn to those types of endeavors. That image, however, served to heighten the intensity of the already very intense interdepartmental power struggles, political patronage, and turf protecting in the command ranks, which made launching the QRT program damn near impossible. Finally, limited funds and the necessity of committing manpower to street crime reduction operations determined the nature, quality, and quantity of equipment that could be purchased; the time and manpower that could be committed to the training program; and the deployment operational strategies of the teams on the street.

Although the “SWAT” television program is no longer on the air, the image it perpetrated still survives to a limited extent and still affects the public’s image of SWAT. As proof of this, consider that any nationally televised SWAT type incident will invariably result in outcries from various and sundry community “leaders” regarding the militarization of police departments. Interdepartmental power struggles, patronage assignments, and turf protecting, however, are very much reduced, albeit not absent, in today’s department. This positive change is due in part to the record of the QRT’s performance over the years; in part to the ascension to command ranks by officers who came on and worked with officers who were assigned to the teams; and in part to the increasingly violent situations occasioned by the prevalence of narcotics driven crimes, mass murders by active shooters, and the very real specter of terrorism. Limited funds and the requirement of committing manpower to street crime reduction operations will, by necessity, always affect SWAT training, operations, and the purchase of equipment.

IN THE BEGINNING

By emphasizing the resistance of many of the command staff to the idea of having SWAT in the department, the door is opened for the reader to wonder how I, a brand new sergeant, came to be exposed to the inner workings of the top levels of the department. In the police totem pole, I was down around the toe level. In the early summer of 1975, I was assigned by Colonel Bishop Robinson, Chief of Patrol, to write the General Order authorizing SWAT and the regulations pertaining to the resolution of sniper/barricade/hostage situations. That assignment morphed into writing the justification for SWAT, its operational procedures, training program, and selection protocols. I didn’t have any operational background that qualified me to undertake those tasks. I spent countless hours studying foreign and domestic terrorist incidents, military manuals, other agencies’ SOP’s, General Orders, and training programs to try to put it all together into a cohesive program. Doing that research and finalizing the program meant that I was frequently involved in strategy sessions in the Tac Commander’s office, Captain Joe Bolesta, a strong advocate for the teams. He was a man who was not always completely circumspect in describing the efforts to stymy the founding of the teams by a well entrenched opposition faction in the department’s command staff. Those meetings, and having numerous training sessions cancelled, sometimes after they had begun, because the Deputy Commissioner of Operations thought they were a waste of money, gave me a unique perspective of the breadth of the opposition to starting the program and the determination of its supporters to overcome that opposition.

At the very top of the totem pole of supporters was Commissioner Donald Pomerleau. Those that worked under him or knew him by reputation would assume that if he wanted it done, it would be done. When it came to implementing his policies, however, just below him was Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Frank Battaglia, a man with the reputation of being a tough, old line, street-smart cop. Battaglia was adamantly opposed to SWAT and, at the very least, was not overly disposed to support requests for money for training, equipment, etc. DC Battiglia was a very powerful political figure in the police department and the direct superior of Colonel Robinson. Battiglia’s political ties stemmed from the Italian community and particularly to the former Mayor of Baltimore, Tommy D’Alesandro, the father of current California Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. The “Sons of Italy” social club, of which Battiglia was the head, contained many members who were command officers in the Baltimore Police Department and many local politicians.

To illustrate the sometimes visceral nature of the opposition the majority of the “Sons” held for the SWAT concept, one of those command officers, a district commander who was a large man known for his pugilistic abilities and proclivities, called Captain Bolesta and told him that if Key kept criticizing how his troops performed in an armed man barricade in which a cop was shot by other cops, he was going to “punch his lights out.” While I took the threat seriously, I had no choice but to continue talking about the incident and the cluster-foul up it was. The incident involved a shooter armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle knock-off. It had occurred a couple of months prior to the Lombard and Carey debacle and was a major part of the rationale I was using to convince the upper echelon that a special unit was needed to handle those types of situations. The major’s threat indicated to me that I was pushing the right buttons, so I continued talking about the incident with renewed gusto. I also told Captain Bolesta that, in accordance with the law, if confronted by someone who I reasonably believed posed a threat of serious injury or death, I would use whatever weapons necessary to vigorously defend myself. Those weren’t the exact words I used, but close enough.

Colonel Robinson, who was also a very powerful political figure within the department, was a strong supporter of the SWAT concept and worked diligently to implement the program. The two factions were sometimes engaged in a struggle for control of the department and QRT was frequently caught in the middle. QRT would never have gotten off the ground when it did without the efforts of Captain Joe Bolesta and Colonel Bishop Robinson.

The Quick Response Team, now SWAT, began its storied journey in 1976. Prior to that, dynamic entries and other SWAT type procedures were undertaken by members of the Emergency Vehicle Unit, available officers assigned to the Tactical Section, and/or various district personnel, none of whom had any meaningful training in carrying out those kinds of functions. The primary method for going in and getting an armed bad guy was for whatever cops that were on the scene to shoot the house full of holes and then the EVU guys would knock the door down and drag said bad guy out. Sometimes they would be accompanied by members of the command staff, particularly if the news media were present. The concept of QRT, modeled after other cities’ SWAT, was conceived to institute control of those types of incidents with well trained and disciplined officers.

The acronym QRT didn’t come about until shortly before Lombard and Carey, which occurred April 16th, 1976. The name was chosen by Colonel Robinson after suggestions from TAC personnel were solicited. The name was chosen partially because of the aggressive SWAT image portrayed on the television program. The QRT opposition faction and some city government officials thought the name SWAT conjured up all kinds of potentially evil and horrendous acts by trigger happy warrior wannabes. On a more practical level, Colonel Robinson wanted to distinguish the BPD from LAPD, NY, etc.; thus, QRT. In 2007 the team members voted, as was their right, to finally be called SWAT.

There were no SWAT units, formal training by the Baltimore Police Department, or SWAT operations until 1976. Once I had been given the job of writing the G.O., etc., in early summer of 1975, my squad and I began physical fitness and some operational training on our own time. Lieutenant Daryl Duggins put together a rappelling program, which he gave to various members of his A Platoon, including my squad, A-3. That training was also conducted off-duty. Duggins was, and still is, a much revered leader; a back to basics, no nonsense former Marine who did not tolerate hijinks from the sometimes rowdy youths under his command. One of the first rappelling training sessions he arranged was an approximately seventy foot drop from the Cedar Avenue Bridge. Lieutenant Duggins had tried two methods of rappelling–the single rope favored by the Marine Corp and the double rope favored by sane people. Several of us tried the single rope first, including one or two former Marines. As we were blowing the fire out on our leather gloves we reached the unanimous decision that the double rope was best. Of course, this was all well before fast roping techniques were developed.

The first approved on-duty training occurred in July of 1975. Members of A and B platoons were sent down to Fort Meade to be trained by Army Marksmanship Training Unit 1 for a two week counter sniper course. It was the first training in which the M-16's were used. Although some of the days were twelve hour days, the troops were delighted to have any training and participated with gusto. The next scheduled on-duty training was in February of 1976. A-3 squad was sent to the one week FBI SWAT school. It was held at Gunpowder and had one day of entry problems down at the Army’s Ordnance Road facility. It involved several other police departments and was well presented by the local FBI SWAT team. The attached photo is A-3 squad during that training out at the Gunpowder Range. The two EVU men did not participate in the training. From left to right (standing) are: EVU Officer Roland Andrews, EVU Sgt. Dave Bryant, Officers Roger Rose, James Siebor, Gary Green, Mike Speedling, Kelly Allen, Lee Baker, Norm Bleakly, Andy Gersey. From left to right (kneeling) are: Sgt. Joe Key, Steve Grenfell, George Smith, Mike Hurm, Lenny Rummo, Ed Schillo, and Bob Letmate. Roger Rose broke his arm badly doing a forward roll with his rifle trying to take a cover position during the training and wasn’t able to continue in the teams.

I was scheduled to begin training an A Platoon squad in the first departmentally sanctioned SWAT training on Monday, April 19, 1976. The date is etched in my memory because the worst shootout in the Department’s history occurred on Good Friday, April 16, 1976. In that incident one officer, James Halcomb, was killed and five others were seriously injured. It would be repetitious to go into any detail about the incident in this writing. For further information click on link: 39 Minutes of Terror The most important result of the fiasco of the department’s response to the sniper, John Earl Williams, was that it very much softened, at least for a period, the opposition to SWAT and the necessity for having a SWAT unit. The incident also served to awaken in some members of Tactical the realization that being an operator in a SWAT team required a great deal of work and personal sacrifice. After the dust had somewhat settled, Commissioner Pomerleau made it very clear, very clear, that he wanted the program to proceed.

Another outcome of the incident that was relevant to the history of the QRT was that it was the first time any squad had ever functioned as a SWAT team. A-3 squad was working that night. The training they had done on their own time and the FBI training permitted them to carry out SWAT functions, although they had no standing as a Quick Response Team because the order had not been signed and, as a result, they had not received QRT certification. The SWAT functions carried out that night were: support and observers for the counter sniper, EVU Officer Bob Powell; a gas delivery team headed by Lieutenant Duggins; an evacuation team to retrieve Officer Halcomb (one squad member and a Western District officer, Frank Stallings, were able to retrieve him, while the others provided cover fire); and, once Officer Halcomb was out of the line of fire and Williams had been forced out of the house by a barrage of suppression/cover fire, the evacuation team members entered and cleared the house. The only names of A-3 squad personnel that were there that night that I’ve been able to determine to a certainty were: Gersey and Green, CS support; Rummo, Schillo, Seibor, Hurm, evacuation and entry teams.   Given the team members minimal training and lack of SWAT operational experience, they performed well in an extraordinarily difficult situation. Their performance demonstrated that SWAT training, even if rudimentary by today’s standards, and SWAT teams were a necessary element in handling this type of critical event.

The first Tactical officers to receive QRT certification did so in October 1977, the same time the General Order was finally signed and published. The attached photo shows the members of that group. The members shown in the photo are from left to right: Colonel Ron Mullen, Captain John Schmitt (Colonel Mullen and Captain Schmidt did not undergo the training), Steve Grenfell, Bob Letmate, Neal Hairston, Dave Hollingsworth, Burch Schwabline, Denis Dean, Jim Giza, Bob Franklin, John Maguire, Bob Foltz, Doug Bryson, Matt Immler, Mike Mulligan, Al Erhardt, Tony Garcia, Lt. Joe Key, Lt. John Wagner.

The selection process to become a functioning member of the teams included passing a minimal physical fitness test, a forty hour training course, an interview with current team members, and a psychological exam. The first operational members were picked from existing Tactical Section personnel. None could be eliminated because of failing any part of the selection criteria, including the psychological exam. This was not my decision, it came from on high against my strenuous objection. In those first days, a number of the men assigned to Tactical were there because some higher up put them there as a reward for extraordinary performance above and beyond the call of duty in the fine art of ass kissing and/or being related to said higher-up. They weren’t there to do the job, nor, in many cases, could they. Those men that were issued the first QRT Certificates and Pins qualified in all of the categories and marked the beginning of what could be considered, at the time, a reasonably trained and operational SWAT team. As the teams progressed, men came to Tactical because they wanted to be members of SWAT and wanted it badly enough to meet the standards. As the SWAT concept matured, the selection process became more selective and the team members more capable.

The physical fitness test was loosely modeled after the Marine Corps Squad Leader training program. The minimum number of pull-ups to qualify was five, which received twenty points. Each additional pull-up resulted in three points up to a maximum of fifteen pull-ups, which was awarded fifty points. The minimum number of push-ups and sit-ups (no time limit) was twenty and the maximum was fifty. Twenty of either exercise garnered twenty points with each additional repetition earning one point up to a total of fifty points for each exercise. The final physical requirement was to run one mile in eight minutes or less. The maximum score of fifty was given for running the mile in six minutes or less, with one point added for each four seconds under the eight minute minimum. To qualify for the training program a candidate had to achieve all of the minimums and have an overall score of one hundred points. As I said, in the beginning no member of Tactical was excluded from operating on a team because of failing any of the selection requirements. Some of the initial teams, prior to the certification in 1977, were staffed by personnel who could only hang on the pull-up bar and barely eke out as few as ten push-ups or sit-ups. They functioned but certainly not anywhere near the level of current operators nor the level that should have been mandated for their safety and the requirements of the missions they undertook.

My criticism is not of the courage and dedication of most of those officers. After all, they undertook the same kind of dangerous situations that later teams would face and they did it with woefully inadequate equipment and minimal training. Any criticism is directed solely toward those members of command that were protecting or attempting to increase their personal fiefdoms by insisting that everyone needed to have a “slice of the pie.” Lt. Duggins and I were told that specifically by a Tac captain, who replaced Captain Bolesta as the Commanding Officer of Tactical. Duggins’ response was classic Duggins: his jaw tightened, his eyes narrowed, his voice became gravelly, and through clinched teeth, he said, “I will run my f...ing platoon the way I see fit. The day I’m told to put some do-nothing, tub of s..t into an operation, somebody’s going to get his badge shoved up his ass.” That account is accurate in all aspects. My response to the comment and to the captain’s sputtering, whining reaction was to laugh, which did not endear me to the good captain. The captain’s reason for his slice of the pie philosophy was that, by letting everyone in Tactical function as an active QRT member regardless of competency, he lessened the chance of offending some departmental or political VIP who was responsible for assigning his/her protégée slug to QRT.

That captain was constantly in the business of advancing his fine self up the departmental ladder by any means necessary. He imagined that his journey up that ladder somehow included taking the programs or justifications I wrote and having his secretary retype them for his signature. I never protested because my concern was that the program advance and, if having the captain’s signature on those documents, assisted in that process, it was fine with me. In the end, none of that helped him advance, he retired as a captain. As for Duggins, he didn’t care about advancing his career. He was assigned to Tactical based only on his reputation and merit. Command officers took him on at their peril: he was a brilliant writer and fearless. Commissioner Pomerleau, himself a retired Marine Colonel with a well deserved reputation of being a hard charger, admired and respected Duggins. This was, in part, because of Duggins’ stellar reputation in the department and, in part, because of Duggins’ service in the Marines, including surviving the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.  

The slice of the pie the Tactical captain was talking about was a very risky, dangerous business in both street operations and training. The slices were being handed out, in some cases, to men who had no interest in being genuinely qualified and capable of undertaking the hard work necessary to become even minimally proficient in the job of a SWAT operator. One such individual, who personified the captain’s flawed slice of the pie theory, was the sergeant he picked to replace me as the supervisor of A-3 squad, when I was transferred to the EVU section to train and run QRT full time. He was selected to increase the arrest statistics of the squad. He later distinguished himself by jack-potting not only himself but several members of the squad. He accomplished this by implementing a contest wherein squad members who made the most arrests received time off. The contest was found to have racial overtones, in addition to the obvious violations of departmental regulations. The sergeant was eventually forced to resign because of allegations that he was selling arrest record information to a local company in violation of federal law. From the beginning, he had zero interest in becoming a member of SWAT and even less desire to pass the minimum physical fitness test. As would be expected, he miserably failed all of the physical fitness qualification tests.

One training incident that sergeant was involved in serves to make the point about the necessity to select the best of the best as team operators. I had the pleasure of “rescuing” his fine, fat self in a rappelling exercise out at the Gunpowder rappelling tower. To his credit, he forced himself off the simulated helicopter pad even though he was scared of heights. He was prompted to take the plunge by being told he had to do it or he would be sent back to Tac. I referred to him as being fat because that fact was part of the reason he became hung up five feet under the pad and forty-five feet from the ground. I was alerted to his situation by his squeals and hurled obscenities decrying his unpleasant, to him, circumstance; said circumstance was mildly amusing to the rest of us. He was, contrary to specific instructions, wearing a loose sweatshirt to cover his very prominent mid-section. The sweatshirt got caught in the carabiner and twisted around the line; thus, locking him on the line and leaving him dangling above the ground. I told him that it was time for lunch and that I would think about how to get him down over lunch, but he loudly and emotionally insisted that I get him down. His actions and volume while screaming invectives at me and others, some of whom were displaying a lack of sensitivity by openly laughing at his situation, convinced me he was, indeed, in mortal peril from the immediate potential of suffering a stroke. I then dropped down next to him with knife in hand. I told him that the only way I could figure to get him to the ground was to cut the line. Again, he very loudly and emotionally told me that he just didn’t think that was the best option. As I recall, in expressing his opinions about his predicament and my response to it, he actually used some obscene language directed toward me, which included statements regarding the legitimacy of my birth. Having a thick skin, I ignored his misdirected and undeserved insults and tied him off with another carabiner and line. He was then lifted up enough by several team members, who pulled mightily on the secondary line to achieve that result, to take the pressure off the original line. When they had pulled him high enough, I was able to cut the sweatshirt away from the line. He then completed his trip to the ground. Duggins and I used that sweatshirt in training future classes to make the point that wearing non approved clothing had potentially dangerous consequences.

On a serious note, while we had some fun at the chunky sergeant’s expense, it was just a training exercise. In a real situation his failure to abide by basic safety rules and his lack of the physical wherewithal to climb the rope back to the point he could have freed the jammed shirt would have endangered himself, his team, and the operation. This incident demonstrates the folly of the theory that everyone should have a slice of the pie, regardless of their inability to fulfill the absolutely necessary requirements to become a member of a SWAT team. Further, it determines to a certainty the potentially catastrophic consequences of that theory.

The first certified QRT member’s training course was based on a program that was a patchwork of a combination of one week courses I taught combined with the course taught by the FBI. The course included: team composition and functions; individual functions within a team; necessary equipment; basic room entry techniques; scenario practical problems; and first aid. Rappelling and weapons familiarization training and qualifications were taught separately in one and two day programs. The day began at 0700 hours with calisthenics. Classes began at 0800 and continued until 1600 with a half hour for lunch. At 1600 hours troops suited up and ran to the gas chamber, where they had to put on their M-17 masks after two mini CS grenades were ignited. They stayed in the chamber until it was certain that the masks had been put on correctly and that they worked properly. Each member was then required to take off the mask and clearly recite his name, entry on duty date, sequence number, and, depending on how anxious he was to exit the chamber, his social security number, birthday, number and names of children, etc. After the gas chamber, the squad would run the military’s obstacle course and then back to the classroom. Usually, clock-out time was around 1800 hours.

On one occasion when we were running the obstacle course, the skies opened up and it started pouring. Additionally, thunder and lightning settled right on top of us. As we started running back to the classroom, Bob Letmate remarked that the good news was that it couldn’t get any worse. He picked a terrible time to say it, because the words were no more out of his mouth than what had been merely pouring became buckets and two lightning strikes hit trees within fifty yards of us. They were so close that the hair on my arms and head stood up. The strikes had a very positive effect on those members who were normally somewhat reticent about running. It was a full out sprint back to the classroom and not accomplished in a military manner.

The interview process was not in place when the first Tactical officers were SWAT trained and became operational. As new officers were assigned to Tactical, the process was implemented and became more refined as time passed. The interview had the same questions asked of every candidate. The questions ranged from why the person wanted to become a member to technical questions involving knowledge of weapons, etc. The selection board was made up of certified QRT members and a certified QRT team leader. Supervisors were not required to be certified at that time; again, not my choice. To be selected to go to the training program, a candidate had to be approved by the majority of the board. The board was still not fully operational by the time I left Tac in October 1977.

The psychological evaluation was started shortly after Lombard and Carey in April 1976. Psychology Consultants Associated was chosen to develop an evaluation for prospective members of the teams. Dr. Gill Claperton, the head of the organization at the time, Dr. Ken Sachs, the current head, and Dr. Dan Stern rode with me for a few nights to get a feel for what cops did in the city. We didn’t encounter any QRT situations, but they did enhance their understanding of the world of BPD cops by being introduced to the night denizens and life in the areas of Pennsylvania Avenue in the Western, North Avenue and Harford Road then in the Northern, and Reisterstown Road in the Northwestern District. A good time was had by all and I escaped without being committed. The evaluation, in addition to the normal battery of tests to determine potential mental problems, was designed to identify officers who could sit, stand, or lie in a position for hours in weather varying from blistering hot to sub-freezing cold without losing concentration and, at the same time, being prepared to jump into the middle of a catastrophe in a split-second while exhibiting absolute control.

As far as equipping the teams, members from both A and B Platoons chipped in and bought the rappelling lines and gloves with which we trained. Later, when the teams became operational, they bought surplus canteens, a small pack, web gear, and the dark blue “bread truck driver” overalls that became the first uniforms of SWAT. They had to sew on the BPD shoulder patches and color them with permanent, black magic markers. The BPD did supply the team members with baseball hats with the BPD emblem on it, but, again, they had to color it black.

Regarding other equipment, the only protective vests available were WWI era Spooner Flack Jackets. They didn’t stop bullets, but, if someone heaved a low powered WWI type grenade that hit far enough away, the vests offered some level of protection, ditto for a sniper throwing rocks but hopefully not shooting them out of a slingshot. The firearms the teams were initially equipped with were .30 caliber Plainfield carbines which, according to a study done by Paul Davis, had a one in eight failure rate. My requests earlier and Davis’ request, accompanied by his study, to replace the carbines were rejected by Commissioner Pomerleau who reportedly said he had carried one in WWII and Korea and it had served him admirably. The Plainfields issued to QRT were cheap imitations of the Winchester carbines the military carried. In addition to the carbines, QRT cops carried their issued revolvers and at least one team member would have a Remington 870, 12 gage shotgun. M-16's could be checked out from the EVU on approval of the On Scene Commander and dependent on his/her assessment of the severity of the incident. The first actual deployment of the M-16's occurred on July 4, 1975. Sergeant Frank Russo and I were deployed as overwatch and security on the Domino Sugar towers across from Fort McHenry where President Gerald Ford was addressing the fifth annual “Our Country” celebration. I have no records as to when they began to be used in SWAT street situations. The 5.56mm Mini-14's were introduced in 1981 and replaced the carbines.

As written earlier, the first actual SWAT type operation wherein small units were deployed for specific missions occurred at Lombard and Carey and was carried out successfully by a team with minimal training and no SWAT operational experience. After finishing with my debriefing by Colonel Robinson and Captain Bolesta at approximately 2:00 a.m., I was ordered to be back in Tac Headquarters by 7:00 the next morning to put together two cars which would begin patrolling that day from 1800 to 0200 hours. The cars were designated as 1991A and 1991B. They were outfitted with a WW1 footlocker type box that contained one .30 caliber carbine with two loaded magazines and a carton of .30 caliber carbine ammunition, two Spooner Vests, a box of 12 gage .00 buck and a box of 12 gage rifled slugs, six CS mini-grenades, a first aid kit, and sundry other items that I can’t recall. There was also a box that contained a shotgun. The officers were to be deployed only to sniper/barricade situations. The duty was performed by A-3 squad members exclusively for a month or so, until other members of A and B Platoons completed training and were qualified, albeit not certified. The cars were phased out around 1986. A large van replaced them, but it had to be picked up at headquarters and brought to the scene of an incident. According to current SWAT operator and trainer, Steve Coughlan, the cars became operational again in 1995 after the North Hollywood, CA shootout at the bank. They were phased out again in 1997, at which time the teams went back to the large van/truck concept.

The next and much more successful SWAT operation occurred two weeks to the day after Lombard and Carey. A recently released inmate from an Illinois prison came home on Ann Street and found his partner in the arms of another man. He went berserk and started shooting up the neighborhood with a .22 rifle. Southeast District officers secured the outer perimeter and called QRT. The 1991 cars responded along with other members of A Platoon. Captain Bolesta was On Scene Commander and set up his command post at the corner of Fleet and Ann Streets. He deployed a counter sniper with a spotter, gas teams, and an entry team. CS gas was deployed from shotgun launchers and a 37mm gas launcher. The gas eventually drove the subject out of the house. When he came out, he had the rifle. He pointed it toward the counter sniper position and was shot by said officer with a .243 Winchester model 70 rifle. The officer that fired the shot a member of EVU CP11. An evacuation team went down and carried the individual from the scene. An entry team, made then made entry, and cleared the house.

This was a text book operation that deployed every Tactical asset in the way they were meant to be used. The G.O. was still more than a year away from being implemented, but Lombard and Carey had taught hard lessons to both command and district officers. Commissioner Pomerleau was quoted in the Sun as saying that the shooting was the way the BPD would handle such incidents, “. . . one shot, one kill.” The Fleet and Ann Street incident served to convince some of the doubters and nay sayers in the department, command and officers alike, that the SWAT concept could work and could save police officers’ lives. The journey forward would still be extremely difficult and fraught with roadblocks erected by members of command who saw SWAT as infringing on their territories and/or potentially reducing their time in the spotlight. Regardless, SWAT was on its way and the two incidents in the spring of 1976 provided a solid foundation as to why the concept was necessary and how well it could work when implemented correctly.

QRT/SWAT GROWS UP

In doing research for this writing, I spoke to Dr. Ken Sachs, President, Psychology Consultants Associated, who said that the evaluations PCA still does for potential SWAT candidates show that they exhibit the traits of elite professionals, that they want to be part of the best of the best, that they like the program’s tough, enhanced training, and are very physically fit. He went on to say he is very impressed by their quality and that he admires them. As written earlier, the intent of the evaluation, in addition to the normal battery of tests to determine potential mental problems, was to identify officers who could withstand extreme conditions for long periods of time without losing concentration and, at the same time, being prepared to jump into the middle of a catastrophe in a split-second while exhibiting absolute control.

Those are not routine qualifications nor are they the traits of ordinary men. As an example of an incident that showed the absolute necessity for those traits, the longest lasting barricade/shooting incident in the history of the Baltimore Police Department occurred on May 11 and 12 of 1987. Team members Bob Edwards, Ray Jones, Steve Kuhn, Bob Letmate, Lee Towers, and Sam Tress confronted an armed, coke snorting, bad guy named Jarrod Clayton, who had taken several hostages in an incident that came to be known simply as Chase Street. Clayton had been stopped by an Eastern District officer at around 4:00 p.m. on the 11th for a field interview. He had drugs and two guns on him. He ran from the officer, firing a shot as he escaped. He broke into 1703 Chase Street and took eleven people hostage. Sam Tress, who had been switched from running QRT to supervising the Hostage Negotiation Team, began negotiations shortly after the command post became operational. QRT entered the house at approximately 7:30 p.m. The operation ended in a gunfight and fire, which destroyed the house a little after 7:00 the next morning.

The high temperature on the 11th was 89and the building was a three story row house with no air conditioning. The team was fully suited up with heavy vests that contained front and back ceramic plates, M-17 gas masks, CS mini-grenades, and extra ammunition. Tress, Towers, and Edwards were armed with shotguns and Letmate had a Mini-14. Jones and Kuhn carried their issued .38 caliber revolvers and recently purchased ballistic shields. The team spent the next approximately twelve hours in the miserably hot house until the gunfight and a fire ended the operation.

Regarding the bunker, Sam Tress, when he was the QRT supervisor and trainer, had ordered two ballistic bunkers for the teams some months earlier. He received some push back from a City Hall bean counter, who told him that he, the bean counter, had found some bunkers that were cheaper. Sam asked him if they met the specifications he had submitted and, when the man said no, Sam told him pointedly to buy the ones he had ordered. The bunkers had arrived a month or so before Chase Street. One of the bunkers took two hits and another took one, saving team members’ lives. It was the first recorded incident in the U.S. where a bunker had taken fire in an actual operation.

The On Scene Commander, Major Barnes, gave the green-light for the sniper, Dave Gunter, to take a shot when he could. Gunter, who knew the man was reportedly armed and had fired a shot at a cop, had seen the man moving around in the house, but could not take the shot because he did not have the green-light at that time. After he received the go ahead from Barnes, Deputy Commissioner Ron Mullen, who called the command post from his home, restricted the order to fire only if the man appeared in a window with a gun in his hand. Gunter never had a clear shot after that. Had the green-light been issued earlier, Pomerleau’s previously stated “one shot, one kill” policy could have ended the affray fairly quickly. The team was ordered in at 7:00 p.m. Tress became part of the team in an attempt to conduct face to face negotiations after the team was fired upon early in the evening. His negotiations resulted in the hostages being released throughout the night and early morning until the last hostage was set free at approximately 4:00 a.m. The EVU began deploying gas after the last hostage was freed. A total of approximately twenty-five to thirty rounds of both ferret and 37mm CS gas munitions were lobbed into the house. The CS had no effect on Clayton, who had ingested approximately 80 caps of cocaine during the night and morning. The team assaulted the third floor, where Clayton was barricaded in the bathroom, at approximately 7:00 a.m. Clayton fired continuously through the walls at the team. At one point he appeared, said he had been shot, and fired directly at them. The team returned fire, hitting him several times. Kuhn threw one CS mini that hit the bathroom door frame, where Clayton was holed up. It bounced down the hallway into a pile of trash and clothing, which ignited the fire that eventually burned the house down. The fire forced the team to exfiltrate the house. They had to run past the bathroom where Clayton was and used the shields and suppression fire to execute their exfiltration safely. The gunfight lasted on and off for approximately fifteen minutes. Clayton fired approximately forty rounds throughout the event. Even though they had been fired upon earlier, the team had not returned fire until they engaged Clayton directly during the last effort to take him into custody. Clayton was struck numerous times, but, thanks to the ballistic shields, no operators were hit.

The burning of the house resulted in the department banning the use of incendiary chemical munitions. Also, the department refused to reimburse team members for the speed loaders they had used, because they were not departmentally issued. If Pomerleau’s “one shot, one kill” policy had been in effect from the beginning, Chase Street would have been over before the team was deployed. All of the team members were awarded Silver Stars for their courageous actions. The memo from Tac Commander, Major Regis Raffensberger, recommending them for the Medal of Honor is attached.  

Another example of team operators working for a long period of time in extreme conditions, which were the polar (pun intended) opposite of the those existing during Chase Street, occurred on February 16, 1994. Counter snipers Mike Mulligan, a QRT plank holder from 75, Bob Foltz, another plank holder from 77, and Jan Richmond lay prone in the snow in freezing temperatures in a hostage situation taking turns off and on their rifles from approximately 10:30 p.m. to approximately 3:30 a.m. At that time the bad guy held the baby he had been holding hostage in front of the apartment window and was attempting to put a pistol in her mouth. Mulligan fired a single shot from a position approximately seventy-five yards away and at a steep downward angle from the suspect. The man was hit in the center of his face, but, because his face was slightly turned, the bullet exited below his ear. After Mulligan fired the shot, the suspect got back on the phone with negotiator Sam Tress and said, “you m.....f...ers shot me.” He made the statement with half his jaw shot off. His voice reflected that, for him, unpleasant circumstance, because his words were, in Tress’s description of the call, quite “jumbled.” John Wagner, On Scene Commander, then ordered the QRT operators, previously deployed at the suspect’s door, to make an entry. The team breached the door and one of the entry team officers, Curtis Willis, fired two shots striking the subject twice. The subject had shot the baby, but she survived. Both Chase Street and this incident served to validate PCA’s evaluation criteria and proved the point that the requirements for being a member of the teams were not the routine qualifications nor traits of ordinary men.

I have recounted violent SWAT situations to emphasize points regarding the difficulty of overcoming departmental resistance to the SWAT concept, the consequences arising therefrom, the validity of testing procedures, the evolution of the teams, and the acceptance of the necessity for those teams. In reality the mandate for SWAT teams is that they exercise complete control over a situation in order to handle it with minimal violence. If, however, violence becomes necessary, the training of the operators and the quality of their equipment must be able to instantly bring overwhelming force to resolve the threat. Today’s Baltimore Police Department SWAT teams are more than capable of fulfilling that mandate and resolving any threat.

I spoke at length to Steve Coughlan, a member of QRT/SWAT since 1994 and a current trainer for the teams. He took a great deal of time from his busy life, including caring for his wife and brand new baby, to describe the current training, equipment, and operational strategies of today’s BPD SWAT teams. Steve Kuhn, although retired from the BPD, also provided much information. The teams are trained, equipped, and operate in a world about which us old-timers, in our wildest fantasies back in 1976, couldn’t have even dreamed.

The physical fitness test’s minimal requirements and passing the interview process are now strictly observed. No officer can attend the three week SWAT course without running a mile and one-half in twelve and one-half minutes or less, doing a minimum of five pull-ups, and fifty push-ups and sit-ups. The test is now being modified to include, in addition to the standard physical fitness measures, job related functions.

Once selected, the SWAT trainers will host a three week class that consists of five days of classroom work and ten days of various practicums, including scenario training with issued weapons using Simunitions. The majority of attendees are from the BPD, but other agencies and military personnel frequently attend. Once the attendees have passed the course, a few of the top candidates are selected to fill vacancies in the teams. Those men are then sent for a five day course to qualify them on the M-4 rifles that each team member is issued. Once they are serving in the teams, an operator can request to be trained as a sniper/observer. If selected, that member is then sent to a three week course hosted by either the Maryland State Police or Baltimore County Police. Occasionally, the BPD SWAT trainers will host the class. All sniper/observers are, therefore, also qualified as SWAT operators. To keep their skills honed to perfection, the sniper/observers practice twice monthly.

The equipment the teams now have is the best of the best. Each operator is assigned a 5.56 caliber M-4, which is a short barreled rifle that is effective both as an entry weapon and at moderately long distances. They also have their issued Glock .40 caliber pistols. They must qualify with every weapon they use at or above the ninety percentile level on advanced firearms qualifications courses specifically designed for special operations personnel. Sniper/observers must shoot a one hundred percent score on every qualification course.

In addition to firearms, the teams now have other state of the art equipment, including bullet resistant vests, which are considerably lighter than the old models, Kevlar helmets, and, recently, green uniforms that are designed specifically for SWAT operators. Members who are assigned on a rotating basis to respond to critical incidents from home are provided with take home cruisers. There are two equipment vans, which are being replaced by top of the line Mercedes Benz Sprinters. These are specifically designed for special operations use. These vans are kept in a secure location and are picked up when a SWAT type incident occurs and/or when they are conducting a raid. Finally, they have a Lenco Bearcat Armored Rescue Vehicle, which can be deployed very quickly when needed.

Operationally, the teams, for the most part, work only on SWAT related activities. They frequently conduct raids which involve the potential for extreme violence; i.e., raids where the presence of a firearm(s) that is(are) likely to be used is an element, and/or raids involving gangs. Of course, their duties also include response to all hostage, barricade, sniper, or active shooter situations. The teams are particularly proud of the fact that they haven’t had to fire a shot since 2008. Considering the potential for violence and number of incidents they handle, that is truly a record of which to be proud.

A quote that is attributed to George Orwell describes the mission and character of the SWAT teams: “People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.” Rough describes their dedication to the hard work necessary to achieve the status of a SWAT operator and ready, although not anxious, to do violence describes the grueling training they have undergone in becoming one. They are superbly trained and equipped, and are the epitome of professional SWAT operators. They are more than any of us, who were involved nearly forty years ago in trying to get the SWAT albatross off the ground, could have imagined.   The teams have grown up indeed.

EPILOGUE

The writing of this has been a labor of love. Although I have tried to give proper credit to all of those I could remember that contributed to making the teams what they are today, I’m certain that I have left some out. I apologize for that. That the Baltimore Police Department now has such men in its SWAT teams to protect the citizens of Baltimore, is a credit to the administrations and the SWAT members, told and untold, that made it so.

Today’s world presents challenges to police departments that were unheard of at the time of the teams’ beginning. Active shooters killing dozens in malls or schools will require the best of the best to stop them. On the horizon is the certainty that this country will suffer attacks from rabid, religion driven, zealots. The attacks will be horrendous and, unless stopped immediately, result in terrible losses. While the main effort of law enforcement has to be directed towards preventing such attacks, the men who respond to those that are not prevented will have to be very “rough” and “ready” indeed. The men they will face may have undergone rigorous military training and will possess a furor to carry out their missions that is beyond the capability of normal people to understand. SWAT trainers and supervisors will have to constantly confer with intelligence assets, departmental and otherwise, to foresee when and where the attacks might come. Those likely locations will have to be constantly monitored and plans developed to respond effectively in case of a critical event. This adds an intelligence element to the SWAT concept. It also follows the military model for creating contingency plans to respond to any threat to the security of this country.

In the world of today, there are many critics of the perceived militarization of police departments. It is unfortunate that some incidents have occurred where law enforcement special operations units and their equipment have been used inappropriately. Regardless, given the state of affairs as they exist today, police departments must have special operations units that train in conformity with military models and use equipment that the military uses. The qualifications and training of SWAT operators cannot be lessened and, in fact, may have to be intensified. The police department is the first line of defense against those that would kill the citizens the department is sworn to protect. There is no alternative to having SWAT teams that are capable to meet all threats, even if they work in the manner and look like they are a military unit in doing so. There is, also, no alternative but to have sufficient controls in place, which will clearly distinguish between what SWAT teams can do as law enforcement officers and how that differs from the role of the military. Finally, to ensure the citizens’ confidence, the department should reach out and educate them as to the rationale and operational protocols of the SWAT concept. In the tough times ahead, the department will need to have the complete support of the citizens to address the critical incidents of tomorrow. Given the outstanding performance and professional quality of the current SWAT teams, there is no doubt that the Baltimore Police Department will be able to meet and overcome all of tomorrow’s challenges. I pray it will be so.

 

Chase St. Hostage Incident Commendation 1 Chase St. Hostage Incident Commendation 2 Chase St. Hostage Incident Commendation 3 Chase St. Hostage Incident Commendation 4 Chase St. Hostage Incident Commendation 5

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POLICE INFORMATION

Copies of: Your Baltimore Police Department Class Photo, Pictures of our Officers, Vehicles, Equipment, Newspaper Articles relating to our department and or officers, Old Departmental Newsletters, Lookouts, Wanted Posters, and or Brochures. Information on Deceased Officers and anything that may help Preserve the History and Proud Traditions of this agency. Please contact Retired Detective Kenny Driscoll.

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NOTICE

How to Dispose of Old Police Items

If you come into possession of Police items from an Estate or Death of a Police Officer Family Member and do not know how to properly dispose of these items please contact: Retired Detective Ken Driscoll - Please dispose of POLICE Items: Badges, Guns, Uniforms, Documents, PROPERLY so they won’t be used IMPROPERLY. 

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Sgt. Lee Rodgers

Saturday, 14 March 2020 12:55

Sgt. Lee Rodgers

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Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Retired Officer Jim Mitchell

Saturday, 14 March 2020 12:06
Jim Mitchell
 
On 29 January 2014 at 4PM, Retired Police Officer James Edward Mitchell passed away at his home in Hanover PA. After a visit from his son, Jim closed his eyes and peacefully passed away; his daughter Marry Harrell put her hand on his and realized he had gone. It had been a long struggle, but in the end Jim passed with dignity and strength. Officer Jim Mitchell was good police, a good man, and a good friend, he will always be missed.

Through this page, he will never be forgotten, as we will always have a place to come visit our brother Police Officer Jim Mitchell. God Bless, and Rest in Peace Jim we all love you

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Officer Jim Mitchell BPD Trading Card

Jim Mitchell Circa 1956 with a 1948 BuickCirca  1956 with a 1948 Buick

Jim Mitchell 11957 Jim Mitchell
A nightstick, his claw and that smile

jim mitchell

Commissioner Bishop Robinson
Retirement 1986

When Bishop Robinson passed away (7 January 2014) WMAR Channel 2 Baltimore did a story on "The Bishop", and used this picture among others to tell Commissioner Robinson's Story. I had written Jim, and Jim wrote the following:

It all started back in 1956 when Ed Tilghman & I were in the academy together & we both started together in the old NW on Pennsylvania Ave. After we moved to WD he eventually got promoted to Sergeant. He became our squad leader and he made his OIC. Much later he was promoted Major & came back to command the WD. During this period is when there was an opening for a new turnkey, I put in for it and got it. I worked along with Griffin Dobyns. Again Tilghman was promoted he was replaced with Major Boles. In 1981 I had a heart attack, I was placed on light duty by Major Boles and before long I had become his errand boy; Something that I disposed. Eventually he wanted to get rid of his light duty personnel and I was transferred to Headquarters Security. One day while I was in the security booth of the garage on Frederick Street my good friend Tilghman came through and saw me, he stopped and asked why I was there. After explaining everything to him, he said he was going to get back with me. About a week later I got a phone call a home from Lt O'Hara who informed me that he had set up an appointment to meet with Tilghman, as Tilghman wanted to know if I would be interested in a job offer he had me. After hearing what he wanted me to do I quickly accepted his offer. I was assigned to work with Sgt. Daughtery in a unit that would constitute the handling all the deaths in the department. We had an office on the 7th floor, and whenever an officer died, natural, retired, line of duty, etc we were notified, and we would start our process. We contacted family members of deceased to see what there needs were and if necessary we contacted districts to provide pall bearers, contacted funeral homes and whatever else was necessary. It was a sad, but heartwarming job, and I enjoyed helping these families during their trying times. We also had a retiree desk in the office where a volunteered officer would come in several times a week and assist with any information that anyone might call in for about retirement. After I retired I always hoped that someone else would continue this position. Sgt Daugherty retired a couple of months after me. Not long after that Tilghman was promoted to Police Commissioner, and not too much longer after that he died. I hope that was not too long or boring. (Jim Mitchell)

Not boring at all, Jim is an amazing man, an amazing police officer and has an amazing memory. I am honored to call him a friend and thankful that he would take the time to write this.

Jim Mitchell stick

 Police Officer Jim Mitchell,

“When I joined it wasn’t racist for the white officers not to like the black, and the black not to like the white. It was just the way it was, times were different, it may be hard for someone today to understand, but today we know there is no different between a white man, and a black man other than skin color. Back then the “N” word was commonly used word, I used it, my bosses used, we wrote it in (police) reports, it seemed like newspapers up until the 70’s referred to a black men as a Negro, and women as Negress. Martin Luther King, referred to a black men as a Negro, so Negro wasn’t an issue, and back then the “N” wasn’t an issue, or at least it wasn’t as obvious. Then we were segregated, and as such we didn’t know better, it could be considered propaganda, education, or a lack of an honest education. But black men didn’t like us, and we didn’t like them, I drove a milk truck before joining the police force, and was at Whitelock St. near North Ave, it was in the am and I turned the corner, (you know there’s like a little corner there where there is this like a blind spot, and I was in this big milk truck when I took the corner I hit a guy, and he popped up off the street and said, “I’m Ok… I’m Ok, you can go, I’m Ok” well, I wasn’t new to things like that, and didn’t want to lose my job, so I went around to Pennsylvania Ave. down by Gold St. and flagged down a police officer, he was with another officer and I told them I turned the corner and hit a guy, I told him the guy said, he was Ok and told me I could go, but I wanted to make sure I told someone, I didn’t want to be accused of hit and run, the officer said, (and because he didn’t say, “N – word”, and I want you to fully understand, I will say it the way he did.. he said, “Was it a nigger?”, and I didn’t know any better at the time, that is what we said, so I said, “Yes!” And he said, “Don’t worry about it; you can just go back to doing what you were doing!” So I went back to my route, and when I went passed that corner, I saw the guy standing there with another officer, he pointed to me and said, I was the one that hit him, and that I just left! The Officer flagged me down and asked what happened, I told him, what happened, and that it was dark, he was dress in all dark, (well they could see that, he was still wearing the same close, and he was dark skinned!) I told the officer what happened and that I didn’t just leave, I went over to Pennsylvania Ave, and Gold, and told some officers around there what had happened. The guy wasn’t hurt, he was walking around fine, the officers assumed he was just trying to roll me, or the company I worked for, and that at first when he claimed he was ok, and sent me on my way, someone must have told him he could get money for being hit, so he stopped the first officer he could find. Back then, the police didn’t like to be used in that way, and times were different. Today, I know it was wrong, for them to have called him an “N” word, and not to have corrected them, but my knowing that didn’t come until years later after joining the police. Driving the milk truck wasn’t a way to make a living, it didn’t pay well, and I was robbed several times; I figured if I was going to be in those tough neighborhoods, I might as well have a gun. So me and an old army buddy went down to the police department and joined; we went down to headquarters and applied for the job; shortly after that, they hired both of us. We both went through the academy, I was assigned to the Northeastern, I forgot where he went we talked every so often, but for the most part, we lost contact, except one time; I met him down Lexington Market, and he had heard I wasn’t married anymore, he told me I should go talk to Doris, and I said she’s married, he said, no her and husband weren’t working out, so they are separated, well, I contacted her. Doris and I dated before I went off to the Army, and she had moved on. I met a nurse and we were married, my marriage didn’t work out, and since Doris’ Marriage didn’t work out, I went and looked her up, and we have been together ever since.

43 years, 4 kids, 8 step children, 21 grandchildren, 26 great grandchildren and his five great-great grandchildren later and we are where we are today. But back to his leaving the academy and still at the armory after graduation, he was called aside by a Sergeant and told he wouldn’t be going to the Northeastern, that he and a few of the others would be detailed to the Northwestern District. Well I didn’t mind, back then the Northeastern was called the country club, and I didn’t want that I wanted the action, so I was glad to go to the Northwest; I liked it. After a few months I went to my Sergeant, (Back then we didn’t have Majors, we had Captains, and under the Captain was the Lieutenant, it was a chain of command, and you didn’t break that chain. So anyway, I liked the Northwestern, I had made friends, and I liked the posts I worked, I was young and full of piss and vinegar and liked the action; so I went to my Sergeant and asked if I could stay; if I could make the detail permanent. The Sergeant said, “Are you sure?” and I told him I was positive, and that I wanted to stay. So the sergeant said, we could find out, and he went in and talked to the Administrative Lieutenant, In those days we had four Lieutenants in the district, One for each shift (the Shift Lieutenants), and an Admin Lieutenant that oversaw everything doing the Administrative work in the district – he took care of transfers) The Admin Lieutenant called me in to his office and asked me if it was true, that I wanted to stay. I told him it was! He then asked, “Why would you want to stay here?” I explained that I worked the area before joining the force, I liked the guys I was working with, and I enjoyed the action and wanted to stay. He said, he wouldn’t ask twice, and that he would take care of the paperwork. That was the last I heard of it, a few months later it was official I was transferred to the Northwestern.

It was before desegregation
 It was before desegregation, and while we had black officers, they didn’t drive in cars, they couldn’t work certain areas, they hated us, and we hated them… I remember when they desegregated, it was 1966 and we were not happy, I mean we all had regular partners, guys we worked with, we knew and trusted, our partners were guys we knew had our backs, and we didn’t know the black officers, we didn’t know if they would fight when we needed someone to fight, and back then there were a lot of fights. So my Sergeant pulled me aside, and told me, “If this nigger goes to sleep, I want you to call me; I want to you tell me so I can come out and catch him, and then I can fire his black ass, and we can put an end to this bull shit!” so I said, “yes sir!” and I tried, I was ready to turn him in, I didn’t know him, and all I knew was what I had heard, about half way through the shift, (we were working a midnight) and around 3am, it would have been time to hit the hole, (Back then when we were going to go to sleep, we called it, “Hitting the hole”!) but I didn’t know the guy, so I just kept driving around, finally he said to me, “Do you boys hit the hole?” I said, “Hit the hole? I’m sorry, I don’t know what you mean!” (of course I did, but I couldn’t have him know that!). So he said, “Yeah, the hole, you know, go to sleep!” So I said, “No, but if that’s what you want to do, just tell me where to go” so he directed me as to where to go, and we wound up under a bridge, and he wouldn’t go to sleep, I was hoping he would so I could turn him in and get my regular partner back. But we just sat there staring up at the bottom of a bridge, or underpass. Finally I had to go to one of the bars to help them close the place, while I was in there I looked out the door and he was sleeping, so I called it in, and the Sergeant came right out, but when he drove by he was wide awake, the Sergeant just kept driving right on by. To this day I often wonder if he faked sleeping to see what I would do, but it doesn’t matter, because by the end of the second week, we had started talking, I learned about his wife and kids, he had a wife and two kids, I had a wife and kids. He told me his wife worked at a makeup counter downtown; my wife worked a Jewelry counter. Other than skin color, and where we lived, and grew up, we were the same, then we got into a fight arresting some black guy, and I didn’t know if he would help, but he was right in there, he fault as well and as hard any partner I had ever had. By the end of the first month, we had become partners, and there was no way in the world I would have turned him in for sleeping. I was actually sorry they integrated us at first, but by the end of the second week, I was becoming more interested in working together, and again I have to point out this wasn’t the 1990’s or 2000, this was 1966, I came on in the mid 50’s, times were different, the internet wasn’t around, television wasn’t even what it is today. We were not educated to know anything but what we were told, or what we read in the papers, and it wasn’t just us, the black officers hated us white officers too. They hated us to a point, that, and I didn’t find this out until years later, but that night when that officer asked me if we were going to go in the hole, and my Sergeant told me to turn him in for sleeping, his sergeant told him the same. So basically, the white officer’s sergeants, and the black officer’s sergeants hated each other, but they thought alike, they both came up with the same plan to have their officer turn in his partner, so he could have him fired, and then we could return to the way it was. You have to understand that, just in case it isn’t clear, the white officers didn’t want to work with the black officers, but the black officers didn’t want to work with the white officers either... What the black officers wanted was to be able to work any post, to drive patrol cars, wear uniforms etc. The department itself had not fully integrated until 1966. Prior to 1966, black officers were limited to foot patrol; they were barred from the use of squad cars. These officers were quarantined in rank, barred from patrolling in white neighborhoods, and would often only be given specialty assignments in positions in the narcotics division, or as undercover plainclothes officers. They didn’t want to work with white officers, but they did want to be treated equal. They hated us, they didn’t trust us, we were the same, that’s why I say it wasn’t racist, unless they were racist too, and I don’t think that was the case. I think racist is having the information available, and ignoring the facts, to believe what you want. Or not wanting to ever become friends even after you know we are the same. Once we worked together, we liked each other, I have a picture of my partner hanging on a wall in my living room, I went to his funeral, and to his kid’s graduations, and weddings. We would have been friends earlier, but we didn’t know, and that wasn’t either of our faults, society and the department kept us apart, it was in the rules, and when those were the rules, they didn’t come near us, and we didn’t go near them, they hated us, and we hated them, we both were misinformed about the other. I know I said it before, but as much as I hated the idea of integration at first, I worked about 10, or 11 years before integration, and nearly 20 years after; those 20 years were much better than the first 10 or 11. I made a lot of friends, both black and white, and I know we would have missed out on a lot had we had stayed segregated.

By the way, Kenny, I only used the “N” word in this to help tell the story, I used the “N” word before desegregation, most people did, and as we grew, we learned the word left our vocabulary. The thing is once we learn, and once we know better, we either grew, or we didn’t and where we grew, things got better. There were people that chose to keep hating each other, and things continued down the road in the wrong direction. But for most of us things changed. I hope this helps tell the story, I didn’t want to sugar coat anything. That is a big problem today no one wants to tell it like it was, all anyone has to do though is read a newspaper from the 40’s to maybe about the mid to late 70’s.

Interesting, I spoke to a young lady that thinks this story was referring to her dad, she saw the story on this site and said her dad told her the same story for years as a kid, but from the African American Officer's point of view. He has since deceased, so I won't use his name, but I will say this, according to her, the African American officers of the time (from what her dad told her) were proud of being part of the police that broke the color barrier. They were the Jackie Robinson of the Baltimore Police Department. They put up with a lot of ugly times, to make things what they are today. I came on in 1987, I had several African American partners; race wasn’t an issue, we did our job, we fought together, laughed together and were friends. I can only imagine how it was for everyone involved and am glad to have come on when I did. We have come a long way.

If you have a story, pictures, or information you would like to add to the site, please send them our way... and as always thank you visiting our site.

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POLICE INFORMATION

Copies of: Your Baltimore Police Department Class Photo, Pictures of our Officers, Vehicles, Equipment, Newspaper Articles relating to our department and or officers, Old Departmental Newsletters, Lookouts, Wanted Posters, and or Brochures. Information on Deceased Officers and anything that may help Preserve the History and Proud Traditions of this agency. Please contact Retired Detective Kenny Driscoll.

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NOTICE

How to Dispose of Old Police Items

If you come into possession of Police items from an Estate or Death of a Police Officer Family Member and do not know how to properly dispose of these items please contact: Retired Detective Ken Driscoll - Please dispose of POLICE Items: Badges, Guns, Uniforms, Documents, PROPERLY so they won’t be used IMPROPERLY. 

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

 Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Calvin McCleese

Saturday, 14 March 2020 11:00

Calvin McCleese

Calvin McCleese090 class


On 5 March 1989 – Retired Officer Calvin McCleese would die effecting an arrest in his neighborhood - For years the toll bridge at the end of Dundalk Ave in Baltimore County was closed, it sat unused and inoperable. Even longer than that it was under the watchful eye of one of our Department’s finest; Southeast District’s Officer Calvin McCleese lived on the corner of Dundalk Ave and Bullneck Rd. just across the street from the bridge and Watersedge Park, the ladies and gentlemen that collected tolls were safe from anyone trying to bring them harm. Even though its location is in the county, like his family, and his post, Officer McCleese protected his neighborhood. He had two sons Michael, and Jeff that would also grow up to be Police.

Calvin McCleese worked his entire career with the Baltimore Police Department all in the same area since his joining in 1957. He started out in Eastern District's Southeast Substation until 1958/59 when Southeast Station House on Eastern Ave. opened. The kind of police Calvin was; on 22 Jan 1970, while patrolling in Highland town, he grew suspicious of a car parked around the corner from The Chesapeake Federal Savings and Loan. Officer McCleese approached the car just as the car’s tag number was broadcast over his radio in a report about a bank robbery at The Chesapeake S&L. Officer McCleese pulled his handgun and single-handedly captured the two men in the car, one of which was armed with a sawed-off shotgun. But that was 1970, and that was the way Officer McCleese worked.

He retired from the department in 1985 and went on to be the typical retired police… He still looked out for his family and his neighborhood… until this day in 1989 when a vehicle being operated by a drunk driver either not knowing the bridge was closed, or just plain lost control, but it hit the bridge embankments, had an accident and his car burst into flames… Retired Officer McCleese ran to the driver’s aid, after breaking the windows and getting the driver out, the driver woke up. Fearing he would be arrested for DWI, and an out of state warrant he decided he would fight the man that just came to his aid and saved his life. Having just fought his way into a burning car, and getting a man out, then realizing the man was drunk, Officer McCleese wasn’t about to just let him go. So he fought back, subduing the individual until Baltimore County Police would show up on scene, laying on top of him pinning him down when police arrived and took over the arrest. Officer McCleese had had a heart attack which he would succumb to on scene. Officer McCleese had held on for as long as he could. His last action in his life was to first save a life, and then to effect an arrest of a drunk driver and wanted fugitive.

Those that knew him, knew how much he loved being a Baltimore Police Officer, the pride he had in wearing our badge, and while he had already been retired for a few years, he died on this day in 1989 doing what he loved best… serving his community. BTW, one of the ladies P/O McCleese was intent on guarding at that toll booth was his wife, Rebecca McCleese the mother of his two sons.

May he never be forgotten as "His service "Honored" the City of Baltimore and the Police Department" God bless and RIP

#‎BPDNeverForget‬

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POLICE INFORMATION

Copies of: Your Baltimore Police Department Class Photo, Pictures of our Officers, Vehicles, Equipment, Newspaper Articles relating to our department and or officers, Old Departmental Newsletters, Lookouts, Wanted Posters, and or Brochures. Information on Deceased Officers and anything that may help Preserve the History and Proud Traditions of this agency. Please contact Retired Detective Kenny Driscoll.

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

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NOTICE

How to Dispose of Old Police Items

If you come into possession of Police items from an Estate or Death of a Police Officer Family Member and do not know how to properly dispose of these items please contact: Retired Detective Ken Driscoll - Please dispose of POLICE Items: Badges, Guns, Uniforms, Documents, PROPERLY so they won’t be used IMPROPERLY.

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Sector Map

CD - SE - E - NE - N - NW - SW - S

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll

Capt. Jimmy Lyston

Saturday, 14 March 2020 10:26

Capt. Jimmy Lyston

Sergeant Lyston 1947

Excerpts from “The Lyston's – A Story of One Baltimore Family and Our National Pastime” by Jimmy Keenan     

Jimmy Lyston was born in the Waverly section of Baltimore, Maryland on January 18, 1903. He was the youngest of four children born to John M. Lyston [a former major league baseball player and U.S Customs Inspector] and Katherine Josephine Concannon Lyston. John M.’s two brothers. Bill and Morty, were also professional baseball players. Jimmy attended St. Ann’s Grammar school and later Loyola High School where he played on the football and baseball teams. He signed his first professional baseball contract with Jack Dunn’s International League Baltimore Orioles in early January of 1921 at the age of 17. Jimmy Lyston married the former Edith Wade on December 26, 1929 and the couple had two daughters, Peggy born in 1930 and Nancy born in 1942. 

Lyston played professional baseball until June of 1931. At that time, he resigned from the Hagerstown Hubs of the Middle Atlantic League to become a Baltimore City Police officer. In 1924, the Baltimore City Police Department, at the behest of Commissioner Charles D. Gaither, formed an All-Star baseball team that was made up of the best ball-playing policemen from each district. Nearly all the members of the ball club were former professional baseball players. Jimmy Lyston played on the Baltimore Police baseball team from July of 1931 until it was disbanded by Commissioner Robert F. Stanton in the spring of 1940. During that time, the Baltimore City Police baseball team played against the best semi-pro and amateur nines in the city, winning numerous championships. They also competed against police departments from other cities including J.Edgar Hoover’s F.B.I. baseball team in what was called the John Law Series. Baltimore came out on the winning end of the series on most occasions.

Noted Baltimore sports figure Charlie Eckman was the police team’s bat boy during the 1930’s. In his book, “It’s a Very Simple Game,” Eckman reminisced to his biographer Fred Neil about the talented Baltimore City Police baseball club. The following is the article from Mr. Eckman’s outstanding book: 
                        

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An Arresting Team on The Local Diamond

1937 G Baltimore Police Baseball team

One of the best amateur baseball teams in Baltimore during the thirties according to Eckman was the Baltimore City Police Department team. They would play other amateur teams during the week but on the weekends the players would scatter to play for top-notch semi pro teams to pick up $10 to $15 a game. That was a lot of money in those days. 

Eckman: “These guys were outstanding ballplayers and they gave any team they played fits. They had a tough group of pitchers like Hen Sherry, Buck Foreman, Bill Runge, Harry Biemiller and others. The catchers were Johnny Alberts, Joe Koenig and Pete Stack. Around the infield was Hoby Hammen on first … Jimmy Lyston on second…. Eddie Sawyer played shortstop … Tony Schoenoff on third. Their top backup infielder was“Inky” Graff. Patrolling the outfield were, (no pun intended), George Klemmick in centerfield, with Joe Zukas in left…Augie Schroll was in right, with Freddy Fitzberger off of the bench. The other guys were good but these are the guys that stand out in memory. Sergeant Polly Martin was the manager, but the guy who ran the team was Captain “Buck” Hartung.”

Jimmy Lyston began his career in law enforcement off of the diamond as a patrolman in the old Northeastern District on June 18,1931. He joined the Accident Investigation Division in November of 1939. His duties at this time involved investigating hit and run automobile accidents in Baltimore city. The majority of these accidents involved fatalities. On many occasions, he was able to locate the driver through good old-fashioned police work. 

The following are the accounts of three of these hit and run accidents in which he and his partner received a commendation for solving the case:

On November 12, 1941, two cars hit two pedestrians at the same time in the 2400 block of Madison Avenue. Police officers Jimmy Lyston and Wilmer Lerian had very little help from any of the eyewitnesses. However, a witness was able to recall that one of the cars had whitewall tires. Officer Lerian was the brother of major league catcher, Walter “Peck” Lerian. The only piece of evidence that the two policemen were able to find at the accident scene that day was a broken off headlight ornament. Unfortunately, one of the injured pedestrians would eventually die the next day. The two officers eventually located two suspicious vehicles about three blocks from the accident scene in a public garage. Both car owners denied any involvement in the crime. The headlight ornament that was missing from one of the cars sealed their fate. The owners of both vehicles were arrested.

The commendation read:  “In view of the inadequate description of the automobiles by the witnesses, the officers were compelled to overcome almost insurmountable obstacles; they nevertheless were successful in convicting both drivers.”   

On December 1, 1941, a pedestrian was killed in a hit and run accident at the corner of Philadelphia Road and Erdman Avenue in Baltimore. There were no witnesses and the only piece of evidence was part of a radiator grill that was left at the scene. Police officers, Jimmy Lyston and Thomas Keyes, located a commercial truck parked several blocks away with a piece of radiator missing. The ignition switch had been hot-wired to make the truck appear to have been stolen. While questioning the company’s employees, the police officers determined that there were discrepancies in one of their statements. The guilty man eventually confessed.

The commendation read: “In view of the fact that there were not any witnesses and while all indications pointed to the fact that the vehicle was stolen, nevertheless the officers initiative and meritorious investigation resulted in most satisfactory handling of the case.”   

On December 14, 1942, at 6:05 PM, an accident occurred at the intersection of Saratoga Street and Fremont Avenue in Baltimore city. The incident involved two pedestrians who were struck by a car and seriously injured. One of the victims was carried on the hood of the automobile for a distance of four and a half blocks before falling off the vehicle and left lying in the middle of the street. The operator of the vehicle failed to stop after the accident. The only information the police received concerning this hit and run car was that it bore Maryland tags, the first three numerals which may have been 177. Also found at the scene of the accident were fragments of headlight glass, presumably belonging to a 1931 Chevrolet. Patrolmen James L. Lyston and Patrolman Thomas J. Keyes checked the Automobile Commissioner’s Motor Vehicle list of over 177,000 vehicles. After exhaustive research, they found a 1931 Chevrolet sedan with MD. License plate 177-914. The driver of that vehicle had recently been arrested for an unrelated drunk driving charge and was being held at the Essex Police Station in Baltimore County. The car was parked on the Essex Police parking lot. The broken headlight glass at the accident scene matched the fragments of glass that were left on the vehicle. After a drive to the Essex Police Station and a check of the back lot, the Baltimore Police had their culprit. The guilty man was sitting in the Essex Jail. There was no way for the Essex Police to have known about the previous accident.

The commendation read, “For their careful investigation for this unusual accident and their diligence in locating the suspect in another jurisdiction and for their careful investigation of this and subsequent apprehension and conviction in the City.”

Jimmy Lyston received thirteen commendations during the course of his 33- year career in the Baltimore City Police Department.

My Grandfather also described to me what went on during the air raid drills that occurred in Baltimore during World War II. During these blackouts, Baltimoreans were required to stop everything and pull all the window shades down and turn off all lights. 

My Granddad told me about the first time that the Baltimore City Police Department tested a tear gas gun. He said the gun had such a tremendous kick that nearly everyone who took a shot with it was knocked to the ground by the recoil. 

Jimmy Lyston was a member of the Baltimore City Police Riot Squad. An outstanding shot with a pistol, he was also a member of the competitive shooting team. Promoted to Sergeant on January 30, 1947, he made Lieutenant on May 6, 1954, and by May of 1960, the former professional baseball player had attained the rank of Captain. This was before the military designations of Colonel and Major were introduced into the Baltimore City Police Department’s officer ranking system.

The Baltimore Evening Sun of May 5, 1960, stated, “Lt. James Lyston commended thirteen times for meritorious service in 29 years with the Baltimore Police department was today promoted to Captain.

Captain Lyston, a professional baseball player before joining the force in June of 1931, has been placed in charge of the Motor Vehicle Traffic Squad.”

Captain Lyston’s promotion was mentioned by noted Hagerstown sportswriter Frank Colley in his column the following day:

The Hagerstown Morning Herald of May 6, 1960, noted, “After 29 years of service with the Baltimore Police Department during which time he was commended thirteen times for meritorious service, Lt. James L. Lyston was promoted to the rank of Captain and has been placed in command of the motor vehicle traffic squad. 

To many readers of this column the name of Lyston doesn’t register but to those who followed the old Blue Ridge League back in the 1920’s it will click.

Jimmy Lyston as he was known to fans in this city and around the circuit especially in Waynesboro was one of the best infielders ever to grace a Blue Ridge League diamond.

Possessing a great pair of hands and while not a heavy hitter, he was a timely clouter and one that was hard of keep off of the bases.

Jimmy quit baseball in 1931 and joined the Baltimore Police force and has held down quite a number of official positions. Those remembering Jimmy wish him the best of luck in his new post and congratulations on his promotion.”   

Captain Jimmy Lyston was the commander of the motorized section of the Baltimore City Police Department’s Traffic Division from May of 1960 to October of 1964. His command was composed of all of the motorcycle and mounted policemen in Baltimore City. At that time, even some city taxicabs were under the Police Department’s jurisdiction.

In the fall of 1962, President John F. Kennedy visited Baltimore to speak at a Democratic rally that was being held at the Fifth Regiment Armory.

In the early evening hours of October 10, 1962, President Kennedy and his entourage departed from Washington, D.C. in a convoy of four Marine helicopters. The choppers landed at Patterson Park in east Baltimore a short time later. 

The presidents scheduled trip was highly anticipated by the local citizens and there were over 30,000 people at the park to get a look at the President. Senate hopeful, Daniel Brewster, along with Senators Garmatz and Fallon, flew inthe helicopter convoy with the President.

Many of Baltimore’s prominent Democrats were in the crowd including Governor Tawes, Mayor Grady and City Comptroller Louis Goldstein.  Captain Jimmy Lyston and most of Baltimore’s high- ranking police officers were positioned at the park to meet the President.

When the Presidential helicopter landed at the park, the Commander-in-Chief disembarked and ran briskly to his waiting vehicle with Secret Service agents close behind. My Granddad made mention of the fact the President never wore a hat, which most men did at that time. President Kennedy’s blue Continental convertible had been driven over from Washington, D.C. for the occasion. Tragically, this would be the same vehicle in which the President would be assassinated in just over a year later. 

President Kennedy’s Baltimore motorcade pulled out from Patterson Park and headed west on Eastern Avenue. All of the motorcycle policemen in President Kennedy’s motorcade that day in Baltimore were under the command of Captain Lyston. The procession then made a right turn at Washington Street, proceeded north a few blocks and made a left turn at North Avenue. It then moved west on North Avenue to another left at Howard Street. The motorcade then headed south on Howard Street and made a right into the Fifth Regiment Armory’s parking lot. There were crowds lined up with cheering people three rows deep all along the route of the motorcade.

The Baltimore Sun of October 11, 1962, stated that 1 out of 5 of the city’s 1,000,000 inhabitants had come out to see the President. It also stated that there were 1,400 local police officers on duty that night. There were 8,000 people packed in the Armory and another 12,000 people outside of the building. There were loud speakers hooked up to the exterior of the Armory so everyone outside could hear the speeches. Former Mayor Tommy D’Alesandro was the Master of Ceremonies for the event.

The Democrats were only able to purchase a limited amount of TV and radio time for the event. To be fair, each member of the Statewide Democratic ticket was given a chance to speak at the podium. The candidates spoke quickly and then sat down so the next person could have their turn. When it was President’s Kennedy’s time to speak, he stood up, smiled, and said, “I’ve never seen so many Democrats say so much in so little time.” 

In his speech that evening, the President complimented the work of the Eighty- Seventh Congress that was in session. The President stated that they had just enacted the Trade Expansion Act, and that they had given the go signal for efforts to assure that the United States would be first in the space race by 1970. He then spoke a few complimentary words about each candidate that was in attendance that evening before finally wrapping it up. The President’s speech lasted about six minutes. 

At the conclusion of the rally, Captain Lyston got a chance to speak with President Kennedy at the armory. The two shook hands, the President telling Captain Lyston how impressed he was with the fine job that the Baltimore City motorcycle policemen had done in leading the motorcade to the Armory.     

The leader of the free world and his entourage got back in their cars and the motorcade proceeded back to Patterson Park where they returned to Washington D.C. by helicopter. The President was in Baltimore for a total of one hour and twenty- two minutes. My Grandfather told me that meeting President Kennedy was one of the highlights of his police career. 

On a darker note, there was actually a threat made on the President’s life prior to his trip to Baltimore. The day before the President’s arrival, a local newspaper reported that it had received an anonymous phone call from someone threatening to assassinate the President while he was in Baltimore. 

The Baltimore Sun of October 11, 1962, wrote, “Following a threat to kill President Kennedy during his Baltimore visit, police yesterday arrested a 27 year old man near Patterson Park where the President’s helicopter landed. The unarmed suspect was picked up in the 400 block South Linwood Avenue about 3P.M. as police and Secret Service men converged in the park to prepare for the President’s arrival.

He was taken to the Southeastern police station and booked for investigation. Police continued to hold him last night without placing any charges.

The arrest followed a telephoned threat on the President’s life that was made to a newspaper earlier in the day.

A man with a husky voice said, “I’m going to shoot President Kennedy tonight in the parade.”

Police said the man in custody first claimed to be an undercover agent, and then said he was a newspaper reporter. They were unable to link him immediately with the threatening phone call.

More then 1,400 local policemen were on hand to protect Mr. Kennedy during his brief Baltimore stay.”  

Thanks to the great work and keen observation of the Baltimore City Police Department, President Kennedy remained safe during his visit in Baltimore.

Captain Lyston was a member of a Baltimore City Police Commission that was involved with determining the practicality of building Baltimore’s Harbor Tunnel Thruway. The Harbor Tunnel was eventually opened to the public in November of 1957.

In regard to driving safety, Captain Lyston was instrumental in having the painted white line on the right hand side of the road being made mandatory in the state of Maryland.                 

Captain Lyston and other high- ranking Baltimore Police officials rode in the lead cars in all of the Baltimore Parades during his time as commander of the Traffic Division.

Captain James L. Lyston retired from the Baltimore City Police Department in October of 1964 after thirty-three years and four months of dedicated service.     

    1935 News article Police Shoot Man in fight

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G 1002 Police hiring letterg 1003 auto accident 1948HHH Jimmy Lyston attending awards ceremony
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Lyston promoted to captain Evening Sun May 5 1960

Patrolman Lyston 1931

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July 8, 1936: Baltimore police tame the U.S. Olympic baseball team

This article was written by Jimmy Keenan

Baseball was played at the Olympics for the first time as a demonstration sport at St. Louis in 1904; very little information on this game is available. Further Olympic baseball exhibitions took place in 1912 and 1924. Hoping to make baseball a sanctioned medal event, former major leaguer Les Mann petitioned the Olympic Committee to allow him to form a team to play Japan at the 1936 Summer Games in Berlin. In addition to his title of general manager of the Olympic ballclub, Mann was the executive vice president of the American Baseball Congress as well as the dean of Max Carey’s baseball school in Miami. In November of 1934 the Olympic Committee accepted Mann’s offer.

In the fall of 1935, Mann and future Hall of Famer Max Carey took a group of college players, sponsored by Wheaties, to Japan for what turned out to be a successful 20-game exhibition tour. The following summer Mann began the selection process for the US Olympic baseball team. After tryouts around the country, Mann took his Olympic hopefuls to Baltimore in early July for the squad’s final workouts. Each player who made the team was required to put up $500 to cover his expenses.

The head coach of Olympic baseball team was Harry Wolter, the Stanford University head coach. The other coaches and advisers were Dinty Dennis, Miami Herald sports editor; George Laing of the Penn Athletic Club in Philadelphia; Linn Wells, baseball coach at Bowdoin College in Waterville, Maine; and Judson Hyames, baseball coach at Western State Teachers College in Kalamazoo, Michigan. George “Tiny” Parker and veteran baseball scout John “Poke” Whalen were selected by Mann to accompany the team to Berlin as umpires.

The team practiced at Gibbons Field in the Irvington section of West Baltimore. These grounds, which are adjacent to Mount Saint Joseph High School, are now called Slentz Field. In order to give local players an opportunity to make the squad, nearly 60 of Baltimore’s best amateurs were asked to try out. Four teams were selected from this group, then matched up in a doubleheader at Bugle Field in East Baltimore. A dozen of the best players from those two games were placed on a team called the Pimlico All-Stars. On July 4 the Olympians played the All-Stars at the Pimlico Oval. Team USA won the contest 12-9, scoring five runs in the top of the ninth to secure the win. Baltimorean Bill Kidd, star backstop for the Chesapeake Baking Company, caught part of the game for the Olympians.

On July 7, the US Olympic baseball team went to Washington to play a fundraising game against the Quantico Marines at Griffith Stadium. Team USA came out on top 15-2 in front of several thousand patriotic supporters.

The next day the Olympians squared off against the Baltimore City Police Department baseball team at Bugle Field. The Police roster was made up almost entirely of former professional baseball players who left Organized Baseball to pursue a career in law enforcement. The manager of the police team, Polly Martin, chose Edward “Augie” Schroll as his starting pitcher. Schroll pitched for the Cambridge Canners in the Class D Eastern Shore League in 1922. The hard-throwing right-hander posted a 10-9 record with 146 strikeouts while leading the circuit in innings pitched (205). Team USA manager Harry Wolter countered with Eldred Brittsan from Wren, Iowa. Brittsan played two seasons in the minor leagues before joining the US Army in World War II. He was killed on January 28, 1945, while fighting with 80th Infantry Division in Luxembourg.

Mann’s charges took an early 1-0 lead when Grover Galvin drilled Schroll’s second pitch of the game over the right-center-field fence. Unfazed by the early long ball, Schroll retired the next three batters in order. The Police countered with four runs in the bottom of the first on two walks and four hits. Brittsan lasted two-thirds of the inning before being relieved by University of Nebraska pitcher Bill Sayles. A tall right-hander, Sayles later pitched for three major-league teams.

From that point on the Police never relinquished the lead, eventually coming out on top 9-5. Schroll worked seven innings for the police, giving up four runs while walking three and fanning five. Bill Runge pitched the eighth and ninth, allowing one run on two hits. Runge was a 14-game winner for the Youngstown Buckeyes in the Class B Central League in 1932. Hard-throwing Fred Heringer from the University of Nebraska pitched the last four innings of the game for Team USA, holding the Police to one final run. Of Heringer, the Baltimore Sun wrote, “He is a right-hander with plenty of smoke and looked like the best hurler Mann has on his staff.”1

The Police held the Olympians to just six hits. Second baseman Les McNeese went 1-for-3 with a double. McNeese, who replaced Galvin at second base early in the game, was a standout player from the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, area. Shortstop Dow Wilson, from Dover City, Iowa, connected for a pair of singles. Iowa native Galvin, Hubert Shaw of Bowdoin College, Paul Amen from the University of Nebraska, and Don Hibbard from Western State Teachers College all had one hit.

Police third baseman Jimmy Lyston and center fielder George Klemmick each contributed two hits for the victors. Lyston broke into professional baseball in 1921 with Jack Dunn’s Baltimore Orioles in the Double-A International League. Lyston was playing for Joe Cambria’s Hagerstown Hubs in the Class C Mid-Atlantic League in June of 1931 when he resigned to join the Baltimore police force.

Klemmick was a pitcher and batterymate of catcher Jimmie Foxx on the 1924 Easton Farmers in the Class D Eastern Shore League. Both were signed by the Philadelphia Athletics at the end of the season. On April 25, 1924, Klemmick had struck out 21 Severn batters while pitching for Polytechnic High School in Baltimore.

Schroll, who played the infield when he wasn’t on the mound, helped his cause with two safeties in three trips to the plate.

Henry Sherry, another member of the police squad, was a former pitcher-infielder-outfielder in the Class D Blue Ridge League. He and Runge pitched as the police team captured two pennants in 1936. The first was in the local Inter-club League, where the Blue-coats finished with a record of 14-3. The second championship was earned in what was called the John Law Series, games played between police-department baseball teams from Baltimore, Washington, Alexandria, Virginia, Norfolk, Virginia, and the FBI. All the teams had players with professional baseball experience so this was always a hard-fought series.

Surprisingly, no Baltimoreans were chosen to play on the Olympic baseball team. Edwin Mumma from Sharpsburg, Maryland, worked out with Team USA during the practice sessions, but he didn’t make the trip to Berlin, presumably due to an injured ankle. The Baltimore Sun noted that the Olympic squad included five members of George Laing’s Penn Athletic Club. Baseball-Reference.com shows that four of the 21 members of the Olympic baseball squad were from Wolter’s Stanford team.

On July 15 the US Olympic delegation left New York for Germany aboard the steamer Manhattan. The Japanese were scheduled to play an exhibition game against Mann’s club in Berlin but they somewhat belatedly decided to withdraw from the competition. Japan did, however, send a group of athletes to Germany to compete in other Olympic sports. The reason for canceling the baseball game lies somewhere in the chilly relationship between Washington and Tokyo at this time. This rift was due to a variety of issues including recent upheaval in the Japanese government caused by an attempted coup, as well as the country’s harsh military policies in East Asia.

On the evening of August 12, the US team played an intrasquad demonstration game on an all-grass field inside a running track at the dimly lit Olympic Stadium in Berlin. The two teams, named the World Champions and the U.S Olympics, played seven innings with the Champions coming out on top, 6-5, on a walk-off homer by Les McNeese. The crowd was estimated to be anywhere from 90,000 to 125,000.

America’s national pastime made such a favorable impression on the Olympic directors that the sport was scheduled for inclusion at the 1940 Games in Tokyo. The Games were canceled because of World War II.

Baseball was played in single-game demonstrations again at the 1952, 1956, and 1964 Olympics. Still not a sanctioned medal event, the first Olympic baseball tournament was held in 1984, followed by a similar competition in 1988. Finally in 1992, baseball became an official Olympic medal sport. The sport’s tenure on the world stage would turn out to be short-lived. In 2005 the International Olympic Committee eliminated baseball and softball after the 2008 games in Beijing. As of 2016, the Olympic ban on both sports was still in effect.

Author’s note - Baltimore Police third baseman Jimmy Lyston was the author’s grandfather.

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POLICE INFORMATION

Copies of: Your Baltimore Police Department Class Photo, Pictures of our Officers, Vehicles, Equipment, Newspaper Articles relating to our department and or officers, Old Departmental Newsletters, Lookouts, Wanted Posters, and or Brochures. Information on Deceased Officers and anything that may help Preserve the History and Proud Traditions of this agency. Please contact Retired Detective Kenny Driscoll.

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How to Dispose of Old Police Items

If you come into possession of Police items from an Estate or Death of a Police Officer Family Member and do not know how to properly dispose of these items please contact: Retired Detective Ken Driscoll - Please dispose of POLICE Items: Badges, Guns, Uniforms, Documents, PROPERLY so they won’t be used IMPROPERLY. 

Please contact Det. Ret. Kenny Driscoll if you have any pictures of you or your family members and wish them remembered here on this tribute site to Honor the fine men and women who have served with Honor and Distinction at the Baltimore Police Department.

Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. follow us on Twitter @BaltoPoliceHist or like us on Facebook or mail pics to 8138 Dundalk Ave. Baltimore Md. 21222

 Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll


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